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Abstract
How should we measure parties’ position on the unidimensional left - right axis? There
are several answers provided by the literature, clustering around three central sources:
Mass surveys of voters, expert judgements and content analysis of party manifestos. In
this thesis, I conduct a construct validation of 10 different measures from these three
sources, using out-of-sample predictive power as a benchmark for measurement validity.
Specifically, I use the measures to replicate three studies from renowned journals in
political science. As a preliminary analysis, I compare the substantial conclusions given
by the different measures when replicating the original models. In the main analysis,
I compare the predictive power of the replicated models across the different measures,
using the 5-fold cross validation method.
The empirical results suggests that when conducted in typical statistical analysis,
the measures differ very little. For most quantitative purposes, scarce data will be a
much bigger threat to erroneous conclusions than wrong measurements. I argue that
this speaks in favour of automated content analysis as a method for measuring policy
positions, because it is drastically cheaper and has fewer limitations for temporal and
geographical scope.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The spatial model is the
workhorse theory of modern
legislative studies
Gary Cox
Preferences are the nucleus of political science.1 Within legislative studies, the spatial
model has become the premier way to map preferences of political parties; Nobody talks
about politics without expressing oneself in terms of a “left”, a “right”, a “center”, a
“movement” and a “distance”. In this thesis I aim to evaluate how we place parties on the
unidimensional axis – the left - right spectrum – by testing their out-of-sample predictive
power on phenomenons these measures should be able to predict. I compare nine measures
from the three main sources in this literature: Mass surveys, expert judgements and
human coding of party manifestos. In addition, I have created a measure using automated
content analysis of party manifestos. These 10 different measures are used to replicate
three articles published in renowned journals. I find that the measures differ very little
when used for hypothesis testing and prediction.
The further evaluation and improvement of how we map preferences is imperative to
the evolution of political science. The results from this thesis are therefore good news. It
confirms that we are able to tap parties’ position on the left - right axis even when using
automated content analysis, which greatly expands our potential for data. As long as a
textual format of parties’ political communication can be made available, such methods
have the potential to map policy preferences since the beginning of modern democracy
(Grimmer and Stewart 2013; Hopkins and King 2010). In extension, we may greatly
improve our knowledge of political behaviour.
The left - right spectrum is the simplest presentation of a party system, hopefully
capturing all relevant conflicts in the political discourse. While several have attempted
to declare it obsolete, it has survived as one of the most important analytical and popular
frameworks to describe political preferences and “divide the world of political thought
and action” (Bobbio, 1996, p 1). Parties’ position along the unidimensional axis is so
1Chapter quote from Gary Cox’s “Introduction to the Special Issue”, Political Analysis 2001, p. 189
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central to the legislative theories, that unless we map it correctly, a whole subfield will
be in trouble (see for example Gehlbach 2013).
Mapping the spectrum is a descriptive task. But parties’ positions along a spatial axis
is fundamentally unobservable. We have no microscope to reveal the DNA of politics.
Its measurement is inherently uncertain. This combination of theoretical importance and
inherent uncertainty makes evaluation of their measurement validity especially crucial –
and hard: For there is no intuitive benchmark for what makes a “correct” measure.
Most empirical evaluations in the literature thus far have reclined to correlations
(Bakker, Vries, Edwards, Hooghe, Jolly, Marks, Polk, Rovny, Steenbergen and Vachu-
dova 2012 ; Gabel and Huber 2000; Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, Budge and McDonald
2007; Ko¨nig, Marbach and Osnabru¨gge 2013; Slapin and Proksch 2008). For hypothe-
sis testing in quantitative political science, different correlations are uninformative and
irresolute. Uninformative because different correlations does not tell us anything about
which measure best captures the position of a political party, and thus is best suited for
helping us avoid making erroneous conclusions in hypothesis testing and other statistical
analyses. Irresolute because it is ambiguous what makes a “‘high” or “low” correlation.
In this thesis, I will instead use the measures to replicate acknowledged models of
causal theories and use this to do out-of-sample prediction. This facilitates investigation
of how the various measures operates in an environment that is relevant for many quan-
titative endeavours. The results can also be presented in ways that inform the scholar
of relevant information, such as mean error between predicted and actual outcomes or
loss of precision due to lower coverage. Correlations have no such attribute. This is the
second main argument in my thesis: many of the current validations are insufficient.
The downside is that the replicated causal hypothesis must be assumed to be true.
The three replicated causal theories in this thesis are “Wasting Time? The impact of
Ideology and Size on Delay in Coalition Formation” by Lanny W. Martin and Georg Van-
berg (2003), “Legislative Involvement in Parliamentary Systems: Opportunities, Conflict
and Institutional Constraints” by Fabio Franchino and Bjørn Høyland (2009), and last
“Unsuccessful Success? Failed No-Confidence Motions, Competence Signals, and Elec-
toral Support” by Laron K. Williams (2011). As will be explained, no matter how we
choose to validate unobservable measures, something must be assumed to be true, even
though we do not know if it is.
Using predictive power as a benchmark for validation is not without its issues: A
correct prediction is not necessarily a correct explanation. But a correct explanation
does necessitate correct prediction of equal phenomenons. This thesis can not guarantee
that our measures are on track. But it does hopefully provide an informative evaluation
of how the different measures perform when employed in quantitative science.
To summarize, the thesis before you is neither broad in theme nor deep in philoso-
phy. The question is simple: Which measure reduces the possibility of erroneous causal
statements? The philosophy is straightforward: A good measure should be better than a
bad measure at predicting phenomenons that the left - right position intuitively should
help to explain. In all its simpleness, the thesis will aim to be thorough.
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1.1 Outline
The thesis is divided in 5 parts. In chapter two I aim to introduce the reader to the
relevant literature. I start by explaining the spatial model of politics. Then I define the
concept of measurement validity as a question of how well you measure what you wish
to measure. I discuss construct validation as a strategy to determine this. In section 2.3
I explain the 10 measures used in this thesis and the three main sources for measuring
party position: expert judgements, mass surveys and manifestos. I give an account of
how the literature judges the sources’ and measures’ validity. Section 2.4 argues that
these contemporary debates do not provide us the information we usually need.
In chapter 3 I explain the research design. The first section is a short account of
how the data was made and how I handle unequal distributions of missing across the
measures. The last section in this chapter explains the main analytical method in this
thesis: The K-fold cross-validation. I argue that this is a robust way to test the out-
of-sample predictive power of the models (James, Witten, Hastie and Tibshirani, 2013,
p. 181-86).
The third chapter introduces the reader to the three replicated articles. It starts out
in section 3.1 to explain why the “Assembly Confidence” literature is a good place to
look for causal hypotheses to replicate. The following three sections introduces the three
replicated articles. This is done in three steps: First, I explain the article’s relevant theory
for the left - right measure. Second, I show that the models can be correctly replicated.
Third, I replicate the model with the 10 alternative measures. I compare the simulated
effects of the relevant explanatory left - right variable. The chapter concludes that low
data coverage is a bigger threat to erroneous conclusions than measurement error.
The three replications use three very different regression models. I will not dive
into deeper discussions of alternative models and possible assumption-errors, since this
has already been done by the original authors. I try to give a short but informative
explanation of the statistics and how to interpret the results.
Chapter 5 is the main analysis. It contains two steps for each of the three models. Step
1 is a 5-fold cross-validation with all the different left - right measures without any further
adjustments to the data. Step 2 is a 5-fold cross validation with all left - right measures,
but where the data are reduced to the same amount of observations as the measure with
least observations. Since the data is reduced by drawing random observations, step 2 is
repeated 100 times in order to avoid especially “unlucky” draws. The last section of this
chapter discusses possible shortcomings of the research design.
In chapter six I summarize the empirical findings of the thesis with a comment on each
of the measures. I conclude that the most intriguing innovation in the literature takes
place in the intersection of linguistics, computer science and political science, culminating
in automated content analysis. I also stress the need for more diverse validation strategies
in the literature evaluating party policy positions.
4 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Chapter 2
Party Position
’Left’ and ’right’ are two
antithetical terms which [...]
divide the world of political
thought and action.
Norberto Bobbio
In this chapter I will introduce the reader to the state of the art in the literature of
measuring party policy position.1 I do this in four steps. First, I explain what is meant
by party position in the spatial model of politics. Second, I explain the concepts of
measurement validity and reliability and the available strategies to evaluate this. Third,
I introduce the different sources used to measure party position and the 10 measures that
will be used throughout this thesis. These three steps lead up to the contemporary issue
introduced in the fourth step: We do not know which measure is best suited for social
inquiry. By the end of the chapter, any reader is hopefully able to explain anyone the
concept of party position and issues involved with measuring it.
2.1 The Spatial Model
Ideologies span a seemingly endless amount of information that explains the world and
how to change it. In the face of several political ideologies, we immediately start to
compare – and necessarily reduce. The spatial model provides a framework to reduce
political opinions to something comprehensible and comparable.
The spatial model present all political issues as two opposing and mutually exclusive
extremes. The number of examples are endless: Free abortion vs. prohibition, open
borders vs. full protectionism, abolition of private property vs. laissez-faire, centraliza-
tion vs. regionalism, industrialization vs. environmentalism and so on. Within these
dichotomies, political actors can agree a little, they can disagree a lot, and they can
change opinion. The spatial model provides a framework to represent political opinions
1Chapter quote from Norberto Bobbio’s “Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction”
1996, p. 1
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in a simple and intuitive manner. The extremes represents the outer rims of an axis. Any
political actor can be positioned at one – and only one – place in this area based on their
answer to the respective issue. They have a distance between each other, and they move
(Laver, 2011, p. 2473-2478).
The spatial model is so fundamental to politics, that it is hard for anyone not to speak
in terms of the spatial model. In the words of Kenneth Benoit and Michael Laver (2006,
p. 15,16):
Most people – including those who are blissfully unaware of the mysteries of polit-
ical science, as well as those who are utterly dismissive of them – find it difficult
to talk about real politics in tooth and claw without using the notions of position,
distance and movement on the important matters at issue.
There is an insurmountable flora of possible poles. Analyses using the spatial model
therefore reduce it further, stating that opinions tend to correlate: For example that
those in favour of universal health care tend to be in favour of high taxes. We then reduce
attitudes towards taxes and government spending to a more general socio-economic axis.
The multidimensional spatial model usually ends up with 6 - 7 cross cutting axes that
represent fundamental social cleavages and which describes all relevant aspects of a given
party system. Regulars are center vs. periphery, church vs. state, rural vs. urban and
economic class partisanship (Budge 2006; Gallagher, Laver and Mair 2006, p 265-72).
The unidimensional spatial model however, states that all relevant political issues
can be represented by one axis alone, illustrated in figure 2.1. While two parties may
differ in how much they disagree on different subjects, the relevant information can be
summarized by one super axis. Ever since the French revolutionaries divided themselves
at the king’s left and right hand in the constitutional assembly, this has become the label
of this most important division of political opinions.
Figure 2.1: The Unidimensional Left - Right Axis for party “Circle” and party “Square”.
This thesis could have been expanded to a multidimensional spatial model, covering
several of the political axes. Restrained by resources, I have chosen to restrict it to the
most parsimonious.
So what is the left - right division? Empirical investigations suggests that it differs. In
one of the latest and most thorough investigations by Benoit and Laver (2006, p. 191-212),
left-right positions can be well predicted based on socio-economic issues and questions
of moral lifestyle, such as gay rights and abortion rules. But several scholars suggests a
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movement towards “new politics”, where the traditional questions of economy must recede
to post-materialist issues such as environmentalism and anti-authoritarianism (Inglehart
1977; 1990). There also seems to be differences between the old Western and the new
Eastern democracies, where nationalism is much more important in the latter. This is in
line with investigations done by Huber and Inglehart (1995). As the authors note, the
left-right dimension “can be found almost wherever political parties exist, but it is an
amorphous vessel whose meaning varies in systematic ways with the underlying political
and economic conditions in a given society.” (Huber and Inglehart, 1995, p. 77).
Noberto Bobbio provides a label that may capture the most important aspect across all
these subjects. In his classic “Left and Right. The Significance of a Political Distinction”
(1996, p. 60), it is argued that the criterion most used to define left and right is attitude
towards equality. This label may summarize what matters across different cleavages, such
as economic, religious or geographical equality. But the debate of the content is not, and
might never be, finished.
A correct placement of parties along one or more axes is important because we believe
it affects several aspects of society. Theories state that they can tell us about election re-
sults, government formations, political stability, policies and policy outcomes and maybe
even the most important social conflicts in a given society. In extension we believe this
has relevant effects on the everyday life of individuals, in areas like development, lib-
erty and economy. The literature has a wide flora of empirical implications of left-right
positions (see for example Brady and Leicht 2008; Gehlbach 2013; Strøm, Mu¨ller and
Bergman 2008).
Given the ambiguousness of the content of the dimension, it is unclear if a left-right
position score of, for example, 2 has the same implications across party systems and
through time. Most right-wing parties of western Europe does not identify themselves –
and they are seldom identified by others – with right-wing parties of eastern Europe, even
though they might be scored quite equally on left-right measures. Ideological range is
therefore an often used measure, as opposed to the substantial position. The idea is that a
difference score between two parties of, for example, 5 implies the same amount of conflict
across systems. If this is true, then it does not matter what they are arguing about, as
long as we capture the degree of ideological conflict. Due to the strict assumption in the
validation method employed in this thesis, all replicated models correspond to this latter
usage of the left-right measure.
Parties’ actual positions on the left-right scale is unobservable. This is the fundamen-
tal challenge when evaluating policy position. Again, to cite Benoit and Laver (2006,
p. 141), “[i]t is very difficult, and perhaps in a strict epistemological sense it may be
impossible, to demonstrate that a given measure of some fundamentally unobservable
concept is more valid than some alternative measure.” We can observe how parties re-
gard different policies, but we can not observe how this aligns in our spatial model. It
must be theoretically constructed, and empirically evaluated. The latter is the aim of
validation.
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2.2 Validity, Reliability and Construct Validation
To measure is to develop one or more observable indicators for a theoretically defined
concept and give scores or categories to the units in question based on these indicators.
The main issue is the relationship between the concept (party position) and the indicators
to measure this (different left-right sources). “Valid measurement is achieved when scores
[...] meaningfully capture the ideas contained in the corresponding concept.” (Adcock and
Collier, 2001, p. 530). This is best understood as the movement between four levels, from
the most abstract to the most concrete. Adcock and Collier’s (2001, p. 531) framework
is adopted in figure 2.2 to illustrate the measurement levels for the spatial model.
Figure 2.2: Measurement Levels of the Spatial Model
Level 1 is the background concept. It is the most broad understanding of a phe-
nomenon, which in this case is the concept of political ideology. Level 2 is the system-
atized concept. It is an explicit definition of the concept. The unidimensional spatial
model of party ideology is such a systematized concept. Level 3 are the definitions of
the indicators. These are often referred to as the operationalizations. In general, there
are three indicators in the literature: Experts, voters and party manifestos, discussed
further in part 2.3. Level 4 are the actual scores given to each party.
This thesis discusses the relation between levels 2 - 4, and excludes the broader un-
derstanding of ideology. This is what Adcock and Collier (2001, p. 533) defines as mea-
surement validity: How well do you measure what you wish to measure? High validity is
understood as low systematic error in how the concept is measured.
Reliability, on the other hand, concerns the random measurement error. Low reli-
ability does not cause systematic bias in a measure, but causes a random error which
increases uncertainty on the true value: Repeated application of a procedure with low
reliability yields unequal values (Adcock and Collier, 2001, p. 531). As will be explained
in section 2.3, there are several sources of uncertainty that cause such random error in
the measurement of party positions.
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2.2.1 Validation Strategies
There are at least three main strategies for validating measures: content-, convergent-
and construct validation. Content validation asks whether or not the indicators we use
to measure a concept includes all relevant components of that concept, and excludes
all irrelevant components. While this is often a theoretical endeavour, it is sometimes
associated with factor analysis.
The second strategy is convergent validation (Adcock and Collier 2001; Bakker et al.
2012, p. 9; Gabel and Huber 2000; Ko¨nig et al. 2013, p. 14). In this strategy, measures
are validated if they show high correlation with other measures of the same concept, and
low correlation with measures of other concepts (Adcock and Collier, 2001, p. 540). It is
the most common procedure in the literature. This thesis, however, will apply construct
validation:
In a domain of research in which a given causal hypothesis is reasonably well estab-
lished, we ask: Is this hypothesis again confirmed when the cases are scored (level
4) with the proposed indicator (level 3) for a systematized concept (level 2) that
is one of the variables in the hypothesis? Confirmation is treated as evidence for
validity. Adcock and Collier 2001, p. 542
The main assumption made in such validation is that a certain causal hypothesis is
true, hence the label given by Adcock and Collier (2001, p. 542): “AHEM: Assume the
Hypothesis, Evaluate the Measure”. Convergent validation has a similar assumption,
only it assumes that some other measure is “true”. For example: H1) Party manifestos is
the place where parties give a true representation of their policy position, while experts
often confuse preferences with the actual behaviour they are designed to explain. Or H2)
Experts can give a thorough evaluation of a party’s position from several sources, while
manifestos alone only give a crude simplex coding. Since “neither measurement claims
nor causal claims are inherently more epistemologically true”, the two assumptions are
juxtaposed (Adcock and Collier, 2001, p. 543).
Objections.
There are three main objections to applying construct validation (Adcock and Collier,
2001, p. 543). First, it is argued that there may not exist any hypothesis that can
reasonably be assumed to be true. But we can not predetermine such statements about
reality, and there are several causal hypotheses that we have more reason to believe to be
true than the measurement hypotheses within this literature – for example that parties
who disagree more cooperate less easily (Martin and Vanberg, 2003, p. 325). I argue in
part 4.1 that the assembly confidence literature provides several such hypotheses.
Second, construct validation will lead to circularity. A measure that have been vali-
dated by a certain causal hypothesis, can not subsequently be used to test and confirm
the same hypothesis. Therefore, construct validation can not become standard procedure.
However, as a once-in-a-while analysis, it will hardly pose a threat.
Last, construct validation assumes not only a certain causal claim, but also that the
other variables involved are valid measurements of their respective systematized concept.
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In the assembly confidence literature, most other measures are unambiguous.
The main conclusion should be that when conducting construct validation, one must
carefully choose causal hypotheses 1) that are intuitive, 2) where the other measures
involved are unproblematic and 3) where the respective measure have a strong explanatory
power. In other words, the causal hypotheses should be a “most likely case” for the
measure: If the measure can’t make it here, then it can’t make it anywhere (Gerring,
2007, p. 91-93). I argue that the assembly confidence literature is such a case. I return
to this in part 4.1.
While the complications are ample, so are the benefits. By testing how the measures
perform in “natural environments”, the test provides informative answers to questions
scholars are wondering about when they are choosing measures for their own tests. Con-
vergent validation allows us to evaluate similarity per se, but construct validation allows
us to evaluate similarity in ways that matters to everyday regressions.
2.3 Measuring Party Position
When assessing party position, we conclude about an unobservable party position based
on evidence from an observable source. The literature has three main sources: 1) Party
Manifestos 2) Experts and 3) Mass surveys of voters (Castles and Mair 1984; Huber and
Inglehart 1995; Budge, Klingemann, Volkens, Bara and Tanenbaum 2001; Ray 1999). In
later years, a distinction has arrived between traditional human coded party manifestos,
and computer automated content analysis of party manifestos (Laver, Benoit and Garry
2003; Slapin and Proksch 2008). In this section, I give a general overview of these sources,
the discussion surrounding their validity and reliability, and the measures included in this
thesis and how they were created. An overview of the included measures and their source
is listed in table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Overview of the included measures and their sources
Manifesto, Computer Manifesto, Human Expert Judgements Mass Surveys
Wordfish Rile CMHIBL ESS
KimFording CHESS EVSWVS
Vanilla Eurobarometer
But before I continue, a comment should be added on exactly what units these mea-
sures attempt to position. What is a party? The literature is constantly treating politi-
cal parties as unitary and often rational actors (Adams, Clark, Ezrow and Glasgow 2006;
Baron and Diermeier 2001; Brady and Leicht 2008; Gehlbach 2013; Martin and Stevenson
2001; Martin and Vanberg 2003; 2004; 2005; Strøm et al. 2008). In modern representative
parliamentary democracies, the parties are the most important link between governing
institutions and the people. Yet parties consists of many pieces, such as members, some
of them in party cadres, political advisers, central leadership and government ministers.
Ideological disagreement within parties may be equally or more important for the rel-
evant theories, than ideological disagreement between them. In the studies replicated
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here, the unit in study is the parliamentary part of the parties, e.g. the unitary position
of the several human beings of a party that reside in parliament or government (Laver
and Schofield, 1990, p. 15-28). An important aspect for the validity of the measures in
this test is that they are actually measuring this.
2.3.1 Party Manifesto
Party manifestos is the source with by far the most extensive collected data on parties’
position. Since all political parties in modern democracies communicate their political
program in textual format, this source allow for a great coverage. As the only source
among the three, party manifestos allows for positioning of older parties as long as their
political program can be made available through text.
Content analysis of party manifestos rest upon salience theory. The theory states that
unobservable attitudes are made observable through communication and can be measured
through frequencies. It is assumed that the relative emphasis on a specific policy issue
for a given party can be used to reveal a specific policy position. Party strategists try
to identify the majority electoral position across different issues. They will try to get
ownership of the popular position, and emphasize these preferences. A popular example
is taxes. For the most part, parties do not mention taxes if they want them heightened,
because this is an unpopular phrase. Instead, they are pro public services. Another party
however, might gain ownership to the idea of a slim state, and emphasize the need for
lower taxes (Klingemann et al. 2007, p. 116; Laver and Garry 2000, p. 620). If salience
theory is wrong, then the positions are wrong.
Content analysis consider words or sentences as data points. In extension, the process
of generating text can even be considered to be a stochastic process, and thus we can also
measure the uncertainty for the positions through advanced resampling methods. Un-
derstood as data, longer texts provide more precise estimates than shorter texts (Benoit,
Laver and Mikhaylov 2009; Laver et al. 2003; Slapin and Proksch 2008).
There are mainly two approaches to coding party positions from such documents:
human expert coding and automated computer coding. The most important labour of
positioning party manifestos is operated by the Manifesto Research Group/Comparative
Manifesto Project (Henceforth, both are abbreviated to CMP) (Volkens, Lehmann, Merz,
Regel, Werner, Lacewell and Schultze, 2013). These data have been cited more than
1500 times according to Google Scholar, and become “the only (comparable) means
of estimating party left-right positions over a long time period in a large number of
countries.” (Gabel and Huber, 2000, p. 95). They use human coders to place each quasi-
sentence in the document in one of 56 policy-issue categories. “A ’quasi-sentence’ is
defined as an argument or phrase which is the verbal expression of one idea or meaning”
(Klingemann et al., 2007, p. xxiii). The frequency of the total sentences placed within
each category is used as a sign for the issue’s salience for the given party. There have
been invented several different ways to compute an actual left-right scale from these
frequencies.
With the rapid innovation of computer science, the dominance of CMP as an easy
accessible source for parties’ policy position is being challenged by automated content
12 CHAPTER 2. PARTY POSITION
analysis (Laver and Garry 2000; Slapin and Proksch 2008). These methods also em-
ploy word frequencies, but they can be constructed by anyone with a computer using
open source software such as Wordscores (Laver et al., 2003) and Wordfish (Slapin and
Proksch, 2008).
The potential of automated computer coding is huge. Political actors constantly
inform others of their political opinions through speech and written text. As long as we
have access to speeches, manifestos or other linguistic sources, we may map the position of
parties since the very birth of modern democracy. We may position news agencies, twitter
accounts, commentators and other actors in the political sphere. As noted by Grimmer
and Stewart (2013, p. 1), “[t]he primary problem is volume: there are simply too many
political texts” [emphasis in original]. This is the major innovation of automated content
analysis compared to human coded text: It provides the means to simplify the vast
amount of latent data out there. This is acknowledged by both sides of the camp:
To the extent that wholly automated procedures reproduce MRG/CMP ones,
we can look forward to them eventually taking over the processing of texts
with enormous savings of time and money for coding, and an extension of con-
tent analyses from programmes to actual policy outputs (e.g. laws). Klinge-
mann et al. 2007, p. 117.
Validity. It might be that parties write their election manifestos in light of future events
they know will occur. For example, the conservative and right-wing party of Norway were
quite certain that they would be able to build a coalition government following the 2013
elections. This might have influenced how they wrote about the areas they knew would
become an issue in the government bargains. In that case, manifestos will be influenced
by the phenomenons we want them to explain. In general, however, party manifestos are
expected to be quite independent of coming events.
It does raise the question: For whom do parties write manifestos?’ They could be pop-
ulist documents written to gather votes, and then disregarded the day after election day.
Alternatively, manifestos could be the authoritative stance of a party, a document they
always must defend that they comply with and which is sanctioned by party congresses
(Laver and Garry, 2000, p. 620).
It has been uncovered that CMP includes not only manifesto documents, but also
advertisements, drafts, party magazines and speeches. Gemenis (2012) finds evidence
that this causes systematic error in the measurement of parties’ left-right positions. Every
left-right measure based on manifestos in this thesis originate from this database.
For automated computer coding, developing different schemes is cheap since they do
not need to take training of coders into account. Computers however, can not correct
unforeseen problems in the coding process like a human, or the different meanings of
a word in different contexts. It could represent the sacrifice of validity on the altar of
reliability.
Reliability The reliability of computer coded manifestos is assumed to be good since
the source is very clear and computers are 100 % reliable to the algorithm. But they
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are dependent upon two initial manifestos that define the extreme ends of the left-right
axis and which it ’trains’ the algorithm. It is not obvious that different training data will
yield similar results.
One of the major objections against the CMP data is that they underrepresent uncer-
tainty in at least two ways. First, only one coder codes each manifesto. Different coders
on the same document could yield different scores, which would uncover uncertainty
(Benoit and Laver, 2007, p. 130). CMP argue that such reliability issues are mitigated
through strict definitions, extensive training and central control (Budge and Pennings,
2007, p. 138). It should be safe to say that we have no clue to what degree this mitigates
the problem.
Second, the CMP data are based on only one coding scheme, invented in the early
1980s, of the theoretically several possible schemes (Laver et al., 2003, p. 311,312). There
is reason to believe that a scheme created today would look different. Using several
would make the measures more robust, but the high costs associated with developing such
schemes, training coders and gathering data have prevented anyone from trying (Benoit
and Laver 2007, p. 130; Slapin and Proksch 2008, p. 707). In addition, most computations
based on the CMP data assume that the sentence-categories that are relevant for the
left-right axis are all equally relevant, which may or may not be true. In addition, they
often assume that the importance does not vary through time (Slapin and Proksch, 2008,
p. 706,707,711).
CMP data tend to be more volatile than other measures. For example, Fianna Fail
in Ireland had two manifestos in 1982. One of them is coded -8, the other -32 on CMPs
left-right score (Rile, see below), indicating quite a policy jump for this party in a relative
short time period. It is so far impossible to know whether this is because the measure
is better at mapping ideological movement, or because it is more uncertain (Benoit and
Laver, 2007, p. 131).
Automated content analysis suffers from no such reliability errors. However, whether
they are coded by humans or computers, party manifestos may have significantly different
usage in different countries. There is a general uncertainty for their comparability across
countries and through time.
Party Manifesto Measures
Wordfish Wordfish is one of the methods in automated computer coding of party
manifestos, developed by Slapin and Proksch (2008). A shortcoming is that there is no
complete data set for modern democracies. But because of the uncontested accessibility
of this measure, I was able to produce the necessary data. The main goal of Wordfish
is to create an easy-to-implement method of measuring party position without requiring
expert knowledge on the party system at hand (Slapin and Proksch, 2008, p. 719-20).
With Wordfish, the position of a party at a given election is given by the frequency of
different words in their manifesto. Different words, however, have different impact upon
the positioning. To find this, the script needs two initial manifestos assumed (by the
researcher) to be at the extreme ends of the left-right scale, which trains the algorithm.
Wordfish is an unsupervised method, which means that the analyst does not impose
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any word categories on the script, and there is no definition of the left-right dimension.
Instead, using discriminant analysis on word frequencies, the software identifies how im-
portant different words are in differing between the manifestos. Based on the initial two
manifestos, word usage is assumed to belong to different left-right positions. It is up to
the researcher to feed the program text that seems meaningful to belong to some left-right
dimension (Slapin and Proksch, 2008, p. 408-10).
Formally, the functional form of Wordfish is as follows:
yijt ∼ Poisson(λijt) (2.1)
λijt = exp(αit + φj + βj ∗ ωit) (2.2)
where y is the count of word j in party i’s manifesto at time t. α is a set of party-election
year fixed effect and φ is a set of word fixed effects. β is a word specific weight that tries
to capture how important word j is in discriminating between party positions where ω is
the estimate of party position for a specific manifesto.
The word frequencies are assumed to be generated from a Poisson-distribution. This
implies the na¨ıve Bayes assumption stating that the probability that a word occurs in
the text is independent of the position of the other words in the text. This is most likely
wrong, but has been found to be competitive with the more advanced alternative methods
relaxing this assumption (Friedman, Geiger and Goldszmidt 1997; McCallum and Nigam
1998, p. 1; Slapin and Proksch 2008, p. 708, 709).
For all party systems, I used the following procedure:
1. Download all available party manifestos from the CMP homepage, https://manifesto-
project.wzb.eu/ primarily in text format (.txt), otherwise as portable document
format (.pdf).
2. Convert any .pdfs to .txt using the software PDF Mate (http://www.pdfmate.com/)
3. Clean the text by making all letters lowercase, remove numbers, punctuation and
other symbols that are not words, removing “stop words”, strip unnecessary white
space and last stem the words. This was done with the R-package tm (Feinerer,
Hornik and Meyer, 2008). The process of removing stop words and stemming the
document follows the definitions in this package.
4. All words mentioned in only 10 or less documents are removed. This is recom-
mended by the developers in order to avoid heavy weights for infrequent words
(Proksch and Slapin, 2009, p. 7). Changing the exact threshold made very little
difference.
5. Identify the potential rightmost and leftmost party-year document by using the
CMPs own left-right measure for the manifestos, the Rile-score (see below). If the
respective document was missing, I moved on to the second right- and/or leftmost
document. Since I do not possess expert knowledge of all party systems, some
measure had to be used to identify these. Any of the other measures could have
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been used. The rationale for choosing the Rile-score is that it is already at party
manifesto-level and does not rely on other sources. Rile is a content analysis of the
party documents, and the two documents should have dissimilar word usage. This
is hopefully better captured by the Rile-score than the expert judgements or mass
surveys, where the sources are not necessarily party manifestos.
6. Run the Wordfish script in the R-package Austin (Lowe, 2013).
The procedure assumes that word meanings and word usage has been relatively con-
stant, the latter partly mitigated by step 4 (Slapin and Proksch, 2008, p. 711). These
assumptions are only expected to give results close enough to the truth.
While the construction of this measure is paved with shortcuts, heroic assumptions
and loss of control to computer algorithms, it did allow me to position 203 parties between
1958 - 2013 within the time frame of this thesis. A drawback for the data collection is the
dependence upon text in a format that is readable by the computer. Certain .pdfs does
not allow the computer to identify words, and must therefore be manually written into
another format. With serious resources, the data collection could cover more parties and
systems and have better authentication of the source texts and the resulting measures.
The potential of Wordfish is uncontested.
Rile The Rile-score is CMP’s own left-right scale of the human coded party manifestos.
The operationalization is straight forward. Some of the categories in CMP are categorized
as “left” and others as “right”. The categories were created a priori. Afterwards their
fit was investigated through factor analysis. The percentages of sentences falling within
these categories are summed up, and then the leftist sum is subtracted from the rightist
sum, resulting in a Rile-score between -100 (most leftist) and +100 (most rightist) (Budge
et al. 2001, p. 21, 22; Laver and Budge 1992, p. 25 - 30). Table 2.2 gives an overview of
the two categories.
Since the calculation is based on percentages, sentences that do not belong to any
of these categories also affect a party’s position. Imagine two party manifestos, both
with 100 left-sentences and 200 right sentences. In the second manifesto, there are also
400 sentences that do not belong to any of these categories. The position score in the
first manifesto will be 33.34, and in the second it will be 14.2. The team argues that
this makes the measure able to draw “holistic information over all categories” (Budge
et al., 2001, p. 23). However, one could equally argue that the measure is sensitive to
irrelevant information. At least it implies that irrelevant sentences pushes parties to the
center. Since all studies replicated here somehow requires the measures to correctly place
relative distance between parties or parties and a median, this center-bias might reduce
the Rile-score’s performance.
A possible flaw in this measure is that the content of left-right politics may have
changed over time, so that this might be a correct definition only for a subset of the
relevant periods.
KimF. The measure created by Kim and Fording (1998) is very similar to Rile, but
will not be affected by sentences outside of the leftist- and rightist-categories. They use
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Table 2.2: Right and left sentence categories, p. 22 in Budge et al. 2001
Right emphases Left emphases
Military: positive Decolonization
Freedom, human rights Military: negative
Constitutionalism: positive Peace
Effective authority Internationalism: positive
Free enterprise Democracy
Economic incentives minus Regulate capitalism
Protectionism: negative Economic planning
Economic orthodoxy Protectionism: positive
Social Services limitation Controlled economy
National way of life: positive Nationalization
Traditional morality: positive Social Services: expansion
Law and order Education: expansion
Social harmony Labour groups: positive
the same categories, but includes a division in the equation:
Position =
Percentage Leftist Statements - Percentage Rightist Statements
Percentage Leftist Statements + Percentage Rightist Statements
(2.3)
This gives a score between -1 and 1, where 1 is most leftist (Kim and Fording, 1998,
p. 79).
Vanilla. As a way to get a more holistic measure from the CMP data, Gabel and Huber
(2000) invented the Vanilla measure. It differs from Rile in that it does not give an a priori
definition of the content in the left-right dimension. Instead, the “dimension is defined
inductively and empirically as the “super-issue” that most constrains parties’ positions
across a broad range of policies” (Gabel and Huber, 2000, p. 96). This is achieved by
regression scores from a principal factor analysis to explore what categories correlate to
some underlying dimension which they afterwards label as the left-right dimension. They
argue that the factor should be made by pooling all countries and years, giving a “global”
content of the left-right dimension that applies to all countries at all times (Gabel and
Huber, 2000, p. 98 - 100).
Such a purely inductive approach to the left-right dimension has been criticized. In
constructing a spatial model of political preferences, we have no objective criteria for
what is substantially relevant. Benoit and Laver (2006, p. 198) argues that “much of
our work has already been done by generations of people who have talked about politics
before us”, and all of this is thrown away when we employ a “giant feral factor analysis.”
MCSS The Manifesto Common Space Score (MCSS) is an interesting newcomer to the
flora of measures, based on Bayesian factor analysis. Its motivation is twofold. First,
they question whether the wording of manifestos really is comparable across different
party systems and points in time. Second, they find it problematic that the nature of
the left-right dimension is defined afterwards by the individual researchers, as with the
’Vanilla’-measure (Ko¨nig et al., 2013, p. 1 - 3).
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Following Lowe, Benoit, Mikhaylov and Laver (2011), they recode CMP’s data into a
logit scale with the formula
θ(L) = log(R + .5)− log(L+ .5) (2.4)
where R is the number of right-sentences and L is the number of left-sentences and θ(L) is
the logit scale. The + .5 makes small frequency counts more stable without significantly
disturbing those with higher numbers. The scale has two important features: First,
differences are relative. This implies that going from L = 10 and R = 5, to L = 10
and R = 6 is different from moving from L = 50 and R = 20 to L = 50 and R = 21
(Lowe et al., 2011, p. 131, 132). It does not have “end” points, but extreme positions
requires exponentially more sentences. Second, it does not have a natural “center”,
such as 0 on ’Rile’. Lowe et al. (2011, p. 125) claims that this approach better satisfies
“political, linguistic and psychological criteria” as well as “[exhibiting] superior empirical
properties” to the other CMP measures. When categorizing left- and right-sentences,
they follow Ko¨nig and Luig (2012). This is summarized in table 2.3, copied from Ko¨nig
et al. (2013, p. 5).
In addition, the MCSS method attempts to control for country- and time-specific
effects, making the measure more comparable across party systems and through time.
This is done through two assumptions. First, a parameter for country specific bias is
calculated as the difference between position taken in the party’s first time European
Parliament (Henceforth: EP) election and the previous national election. They call this
the “zero hour” hypothesis: “parties took the same position in their first EP election as
in the previous national election” (Ko¨nig et al., 2013, p. 9). The bias is therefore the
difference in position between these two elections.
Table 2.3: MCSS Left and Right categories, p. 5 in K?nig et al. 2013
Issue Pole A (Leftist) Pole B (Rightist)
Internationalism 109 Internationalism/negative 107 Internationalism/positive
European Integration 110 European integration/negative 108 European integration/positive
National way of life 601 National way of life/positive 602 National way of life/negative
Military 105 Military/negative 104 Military/positive
106 Peace/positive
Freedom 201 Freedom and human rights/positive 605 Law and order/positive
202 Democracy/positive
Administration 404 Economic planning/positive 305 Governmental and administrative
efficiency/positive
405 Corporatism/positive
Enterprise 412 Controlled Economy/positive 401 Free enterprise/positive
413 Nationalization/positive
Market 403 Market regulation/positive 402 Incentive/positive
Protecitonism 406 Protectionism/positive 407 Protectionism/negative
Macroeconomics 409 Keynesian demad management/positive 414 Economic orthodoxy/positive
Quality of life 416 Antigrowth economy/positive 410 Productivity/positive
501 Environmental protection/positive
Welfare state 503 Social justice/positive 505 Welfare state limitation/positive
504 Welfare state expansion/positive
Traditional morality 604 Traditional morality/negative 603 Traditional morality/positive
Multiculturalism 607 Multiculturalism/positive 608 Multiculturalism/negative
Labor groups 701 Labor groups/positive 702 Labor groups/negative
Target groups 705 Underprivileged minority groups/positive 704 Middle class and professional
groups/positive
Second, a parameter for time bias is calculated based on the “incentive” hypothesis:
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The party that gained the largest seat share in an election does not change its position
in the next election (Ko¨nig et al., 2013, p. 10,11). Any difference in position between
these two is assumed to be bias. By these two hypotheses, they argue that the measure
is more comparable.
To create an actual scale that is not defined inductively, they use the Chapel Hill
Expert Survey Series (Henceforth: CHESS, see below) data to calculate means and vari-
ances for each party family. This is set as the intercept and variance for parties that
belong to the respective family. The trajectory of the parties is thereafter modelled using
polynomials (Ko¨nig et al., 2013, p. 9).
A drawback with the MCSS measure is that it is dependent upon CMP for most
of the positioning, EMP2 for EP elections and country parameters and CHESS data to
define the means for each party family. If we wish to have a measure that can be used
for all parliamentary systems and not only those that are members of the EU, as for
example Norway, this strategy is simply not viable. In addition, the measure becomes
more resource demanding and thus reduces one of the prime advantages of manifesto
based measures.
This weakness is also its strength. The specification of the “zero hour” and “incentive”
hypotheses makes the comparability assumptions explicit and tries to handle it. None
of the other CMP measures does this, even though they are constantly used with the
implicit assumption that they can be compared across party systems and through time.
2.3.2 Expert judgements
An intuitive strategy to get valid measures of party positions is by asking people that
somehow are experts on the respective party systems. In such studies, party systems
are coded by several experts. The mean value is employed as the party’s position and
standard error as a measure of uncertainty. Asking several experts is expected to increase
the precision, and is used by all expert survey measures included in this thesis. Experts
can use various sources, including manifestos, parliamentary voting behaviour, public
appearances etc. They will often know all relevant parties within a party system and
are not dependent upon available manifestos. Without doubt, the combined works of the
many experts in such surveys have been key for the rise of this tradition within political
science. Still, the measure is not without its flaws.
Validity A common issue with expert surveys is the inability to go back in time to
measure past party positions. Using today’s experts to judge older party systems might
reduce the expert-knowledge, biasing the scores towards modern perceptions (Slapin and
Proksch, 2008, p. 706).
Experts might have an ambiguous relationship which sources they use when giving
scores to parties. For example, the position of the Dutch “Freedom Party” might be
based solely on the position of the eccentric party leader Geert Wilders. If so, it might
2The EMP data are equal to the CMP data for EP elections, with the same categories (Wu¨st and
Volkens, 2003).
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fail to capture a unitary stance of the whole parliamentary group. The source might
vary from party to party, and it is unclear if experts should change their main source for
positioning the party (Budge, 2000, p. 103-04).
Changing sources opens up for the possibility that experts are coding based on the
phenomenons the measure is supposed to explain. For example, in the autumn 2013 in
Norway, the conservative party “Right” went for the first time into a minority coalition
with the most right-wing party “Progress Party”, who never before had been in govern-
ment. This could affect how we perceive the position of these parties. But if these parties
in the future are said to have moved closer, it is unknown if this is because they actually
changed policy positions, or if they entered in a coalition. What we want, is to measure
the former phenomenon in order to explain the latter phenomenon – not the other way
around.
Reliability Expert judgements suffer from both intra- and inter-coder reliability issues
(Slapin and Proksch, 2008, p. 706). Such problems arise when two different experts,
possibly from across countries and over time, understand the questions, sources and
range of possible positions differently. Repeated application of the process could yield
different values.
A way to mitigate this is to have some of the coders to code several party systems, so
that the same expert is part of several different “groups” of experts. This could increase
the comparability of the measures between groups of experts. In none of the measures
included have this been done.
There might be a bad incentive structure in expert surveys. In order to be a part
of an academic society, one is expected to contribute by – among other things – answer
such surveys without receiving compensation. Instead of doing thorough evaluations, all
experts might simply be coding a party or party system according to some important
work within the field. For example, it might be that all experts simply codes right-wing
parties based on the work by Cas Mudde.3 To assign a number to the party is the only
thing needed to get the social and academic benefit, while extra investigation steals time
from other work. If several experts have the same primary source, this contributes to a
fake illusion of certainty: They are not independent measures of a party.
In spite of these flaws, expert surveys is the one source that maximizes the possibility
that one is asking the most well-informed individuals and gets as much information as
possible into the measure at a manageable price. They allow for thorough evaluations of
party systems, and are not dependent upon access to one specific type of source.
The Expert Survey Measures
Castles and Mair The expert judgement data set by Francis Castles and Peter Mair
from 1984 has become a classic within the literature and cited in 741 articles according to
Google Scholar. It is one of the first real attempts to create a systematic cross-national
spatial scale for left-right policy positions for Western Europe, The Unites States and
3For those who don not know him, he is a famous political scientist studying right-wing parties.
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the Old Commonwealth. 3 - 17 experts in each country placed parties on an eleven-point
scale with the following labels: Ultra-Left (0); Moderate Left (21
2
); Centre (5); Moderate
Right (71
2
); Ultra-Right (10) (Castles and Mair, 1984, p. 75).
There is no definition of the left-right dimension. It is therefore unknown what the
different experts have been judging, and whether or not they understand the concept
equally. This creates uncertainty about comparability between experts’ scores (Van Deth,
2009, p. 3).
Huber and Inglehart John Huber and Ronald Inglehart’s “Expert Interpretations of
Party Space and Party Locations in 42 Societies” from 1995 has also become a classic
measure within the literature. As a follow-up to the survey by Castles and Mair, it has
been cited 799 times. They conducted their analysis in 1993 as one of the first expert
surveys since the fall of the Soviet Union. The motivation behind Huber and Inglehart’s
survey was to map the political conflict in the eastern Europe, as well as the impact it
had on other European party systems (Huber and Inglehart, 1995, p. 73-75).
They wanted to map three things. First, they wished to know if the language of the
left-right dimension was applicable to these new democracies. Second, they investigated
whether or not the unidimensional spatial model of political ideology captured all of the
relevant information. Last, they wanted to know how different systems put different
substantive meaning into the understanding of these dimensions. The experts where
asked to do five things (Huber and Inglehart, 1995, p. 77):
1. Decide if the left-right dimension best described the two major poles of the party
system. If not, then write the labels they found most appropriate.
2. Write the name of the parties on a ten-point scale.
3. List the key issues that divide the parties on the main dimension.
4. State whether there existed a second dimension and if so, label it.
5. Place the parties on this second dimension if applicable.
Given the results, they found that 10 categories define the left-right scale: Economic con-
flict, centralization of power, property rights, constitutional reform, xenophobia, national
defence, authoritarianism vs. democracy, isolation vs. internationalism, traditional vs.
new culture and conservatism vs. change. These measures also had a high correlation
(.94) with the (at the time) ten years old measure from Castles and Mair, indicating that
this might be how most experts understood the content of the left-right dimension also
in that survey. They compared how the answers on question 3 were distributed among
these 10 categories in different countries (Huber and Inglehart, 1995, p. 80, 84, 90). While
the unidimensional left-right framework was widespread, there were differences in how
important the different categories were.
Benoit and Laver Kenneth Benoit and Michael Laver conducted an expert survey in
2002 - 2003 for the book “Party Policy in Modern Democracies” (2006) with a thorough
discussion of the spatial model of political preferences. In only 8 years the work has
attracted 979 citations. As with Huber and Inglehart (1995), they define the left-right
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dimension inductively. They asked experts explicitly for multidimensional scores. In
addition, the experts were asked to place the parties on a “general left-right dimension,
taking all aspects of party policy into account” (Benoit and Laver, 2006, p. 192-93). They
define the content of the unidimensional left-right scale by its correlation with the others.
As with Huber and Inglehart (1995), the content varies between countries (Benoit
and Laver, 2006, p. 191-12). Yet they do conclude that unidimensional policy can be
predicted based on socio-economic and moral lifestyle (gay rights, abortion etc.) issues.
CMHIBL Castles and Mair, Huber and Inglehart and Benoit and Laver are all “snap-
shots” from a single point in time. However, since the correlation between them is high,
I have merged these to create a cross-national time-series data set of party position.4
This new data set (Henceforth: CMHIBL) perform better than any of the three mea-
sures separate in the analyses. In order to simplify presentation, only CMHIBL will be
utilized.
The issue of national comparison of the left-right content in these three expert surveys
is probably less critical in this analysis. This is because the replications are all located
in the old developed western democracies. Both Huber and Inglehart (1995) and Benoit
and Laver (2006) report that in this context, the left-right dimension’s most important
characteristic is socio-economic policy.
CHESS The Chapel Hill Expert Survey Series (Henceforth: CHESS) has gradually
become a dominating measure within the expert survey tradition. It contains a total of
4 waves conducted between 1999 - 2010, recently published in a trend file (Bakker et al.
2012; Hooghe, Bakker, Brigevich, de Vries, Edwards, Marks, Rovny, Steenbergen and
Vachudova 2010; Steenbergen and Marks 2007). It is one of the few attempts to build a
cross-section time-series data set of party positions based on expert judgements, although
it is restricted to the European countries.
CHESS asked the respondents to characterize the parties in terms of their broad
ideological position on a left-right eleven-point scale. The content of the left-right scale
has never been specified, but the wording of the question has been equal for each wave
(Bakker et al. 2012, p. 3; Hooghe et al. 2010, p. 700; Steenbergen and Marks 2007, p.353).
The main advantage of CHESS is that it offers a cross-national time-series of expert
surveys. The stability of the wording makes it possible to compare movement through
time. A downside is the lack of any thorough analysis of the content of the left-right scale.
As Benoit and Laver (2006, p. 203) note, since content is different between countries, it
might also be different between points in time.
2.3.3 Mass surveys
Certain mass surveys ask the respondent to place their own position, and what party
they voted for or feel close to. This information can be used to measure parties’ position,
4This has already been done by Do¨ring and Manow (2012), although they also include the 2010 wave
of CHESS.
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for example by the mean position of all respondents that voted for the respective party
(Gabel and Huber, 2000, p. 98). Such a measure of voters’ self-placement and what they
voted is a crucial aspect in representative government.
Mass surveys are likely to give a better measure of the position of the respective
party’s voters. It might also be a good measure for the parliamentary part of a party, if it
taps into the incentive structure of the politicians. The analyses replicated in this thesis
might be least likely cases for mass surveys, but if they perform well, it could indicate
that there is a close relationship between the preferences of parties and their voters. This
linkage can not be observed in a clear way elsewhere, which makes these surveys unique
in their own respect.
Validity Mass surveys rests on the assumption that voters place themselves indepen-
dently of the party they vote for. If this is not true, then the measure might be coded
based on the phenomenons it is supposed to explain. For example, if voters tend to a
priori agree with the party they identify with, then the behaviour of the party could be
affecting the voters’ position. If a party issues a no-confidence motion against a govern-
ment party, this could signal ideological distance between the two. If this affects how
voters perceive their own position, then the measure is explained by the phenomenons
we (in turn) believe the measure can help to explain. This contributes to uncertainty
concerning the causal direction in hypothesis testing.
None of the included surveys define the content of the left-right dimension. If how
respondents understand the dimension differs systematically with other traits, such as
social class, education, workforce and so on, the measure of a party’s position will be
systematically biased depending on the composition of it’s voting citizens. In addition, it
could increase the probability that answers are affected by the latest news, the preceding
questions in the survey or other random events.
It is impossible to go back in time to correct any mistakes in a given mass survey or
acquire measures of past positions. In addition, these surveys are highly costly to conduct.
Never have stratified sampling design been used to make sure all relevant parties will be
represented among the respondents. The result is low coverage of parties and sometimes
an unstable wording of the questions. This makes such measures unsuitable for many
research designs (Ray, 1999, p. 285).
Reliability. The same inter- and intra-reliability issues apply here as with expert judge-
ments. First, the lack of definition is expected to increase random error.
Second, voters may have different perceptions of the relationship between the actual
scores on the scales: The distance between 0 - 1 on a ten-point scale might be perceived
unequal to the distance between 5 - 6, and this might vary between respondents. While
there are possible solutions to this problem, they have not been applied until recently,
and never for the surveys included here.
A more technical issue with mass surveys is the low quality of their documentation.
Some simply use abbreviations for party names even though several parties in a system
match the same abbreviation. Others simply refer to the party family, for example “the
conservatives”, while there might be more than one party that match this description.
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This increases the probability of making erroneous merge-links when preparing data,
which lowers reliability.
The Mass Survey Measures
European Social Survey The ESS has been conducted biannually since 2002. In
every wave, respondents (15 years and up) have been asked to place themselves on a left-
right ten-point scale and what party they voted for. The sampling method varies between
countries, but all must adhere to principles of representativeness through probability. My
data are created from their trend file of waves 1 - 5 (ESS 2012a; 2012b; ISSC 2014).
The data have been weighted with ESS’ design weight. This is their recommended
weight when creating means within the countries (ESS, 2007).
Eurobarometer The Eurobarometer is the European Commission’s own mass survey,
in order to map the public awareness, knowledge and attitudes in the EEC/EU. The first
wave was in 1970, and since 1974 the survey has been conducted twice a year. It contains
1000 respondents from all but the least populated countries included. Up to 1989, there
were country-specific variation in sampling methods. The data used in this analysis is
The Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File, covering the period 1970 - 2002 (Schmitt and
Schloz 2005; ISSC 2014).
In several of these waves, the respondents were asked to place their own left-right
position on a ten-point scale, where 1 represented most left and 10 most right. In addition,
they were asked what party the voted for in the last national election. The long time
series and frequency of the waves in Eurobarometer makes it a strong candidate among
the mass surveys.
European Values Survey and World Values Surveys Four European Values Sur-
vey (Henceforth: EVS) waves have been conducted, in 1981, 1990, 1999 and 2008. Sam-
pling methods have varied between the years, and between the countries involved. Meth-
ods for data gathering have also varied, from hired interviewing agencies in 1981 to trained
face-to-face interviewers in 2008 (EVS 2011;ISSC 2014).
In every survey, they asked the respondent to place themselves on a ten-point left-
right scale. In 1981, they asked which party the respondent felt close to. In 1990 and
1999, they asked what party the respondent would vote for if there was a general election
today. If the respondent was unsure, then they would ask what party appealed the most.
In 2008, they first asked if the respondent would vote and if yes, then what party. If no,
they would ask what party appealed the most.
Due to the instability both in data collection and wording of the question, there is
reason to expect a low reliability, which could disturb the true measurement of parties’
placement.
There have been five waves of the World Values Surveys (Henceforth: WVS) between
1981 - 2008. The sixth wave has been executed but is not yet ready. Each country
specifies their own sampling design, but these must be approved by the WVS Executive
Committee. Kittilson (2007, p. 871) mentions that in “most countries, survey teams
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employ a form of stratified multi-stage random probability sampling. However, in remote
areas where this proves difficult, survey teams may employ cluster or quota sampling”.
Exact sampling design varies between the waves, creating uncertainty for comparability
of the measures (ISSC 2014; WVS 2009).
In every survey since 1990, the respondents have been asked to place themselves on a
left-right ten-point scale, as well as what party they would vote for if there was a general
election today. If the respondent is uncertain, they would be asked what party appealed
to them the most.
EVS and WVS are very similar. For example, the waves in 1981 - 1984 and 1989
- 1993 are equal, with EVS being responsible for the European countries. Since then,
they have conducted separate waves but with quite equal questionnaires. They provide
instructions for how to combine the two data sets. In the analysis, there was no significant
difference between EVS alone and EVS merged with WVS.5 To ease presentation, only
the combined measure will be utilized.
2.4 The Contemporary Issue
The literature validating party position measures suffers from at least two shortcomings.
First, unless more diverse validation strategies are employed, the literature will be stuck
in a situation where measures are true because a lot of different measures agree: A
truth through consensus. Second, as scientists we need more information than current
comparisons yield. I will start with the first claim.
So far, the most common analysis within this literature is to show that the measure
has a high or low correlation with other measures. Yet measures that are not theoretically
motivated, such as the Vanilla measure (Gabel and Huber, 2000, p. 95), correlate with
those that are theoretically motivated. It remains unsettled what this implies for the
measures that are theoretically motivated.
Furthermore, scholars disagree on what measure should be the “golden standard” with
which all else should correlate. Jonathan B. Slapin and Sven-Oliver Proksch concludes
that
While [expert] surveys often come up short as pooled cross-sectional time-series
data, they do provide researchers with a method for checking the validity of position
estimates from other methods in addition to providing a snapshot of party positions
at one point in time. Slapin and Proksch 2008, p. 706.
This is supported by Gabel and Huber (2000, p. 98). Ian Budge on the other hand,
argues that expert judgements
confuse preferences with the actual behaviour they are designed to explain, and are
ambiguous about the time period involved, the criteria used to locate parties and
what exactly they are locating. Budge 2001, p. 211.
5WVS alone lacks several of the European parties, making it unsuitable to use alone.
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Dinas and Gemenis (2009, p. 1,2) agree with Budge in that manifestos “provide more
accurate and representative picture of where the parties stand in the policy space, without
requiring further knowledge about their policy record.”
Over the years, measures have been used to do “mutual” validations over time. For
example, every wave of CHESS has been validated by showing correlation with CMP and
Eurobarometer. In 2012 their trend file was released (Bakker et al., 2012, p. 11,12), and
again this correlation was demonstrated. However, if every wave correlated with the CMP
data, there would be something odd if the trend file of the same waves did not correlate.
In 2007, Klingemann et al. (2007, p. 63 -84) compared the standard CMP ’Rile’-score to
Castles and Mair (1984), even though this had been done seven years earlier by Gabel
and Huber (2000).
The methodological fallacy in repeating the same correlations as validity tests is equiv-
alent to choosing dependent units (selection bias): They are not independent tests of the
the hypothesis that source X is a good operationalization of the systematized concept
(King, Keohane and Verba, 1994, p. 124-25). Eventually, we run the risk that all mea-
sures will have indirectly or directly been shown to correlate with most other measures
in the literature, and we run out of possible tests.
Recent publications have found creative new ways to test validity. For example, Lowe
and Benoit (2013) recognized that a computer based coding of political texts should be
as similar as possible to how a voter would code the same text, and ran a comparison
between these two. Any deviation is a sign of “wrongness” in the measurement. Such
creative diversion of validation strategies is exactly what the literature needs.
The second and more important claim is that we need more informed comparisons.
A simple correlation does not inform us of the quality of these measures, because “alter-
native indicators of a systematized concept may be strongly correlated and yet perform
very differently when employed in causal assessment” (Adcock and Collier, 2001, p. 542).
While the correlation between measures is an interesting aspect, we should be equally
interested in how they correlate with everything else. For example, Matthew Gabel and
John Huber (2000, p. 102) concludes that CMP data, when using the Vanilla method to
place party positions, “can be used to obtain reasonably accurate predictions of parties’
left-right placements.” This conclusion is based on several regressions showing a correla-
tion with different expert judgements and mass surveys. But how accurate is reasonably
accurate? Vanilla got a significant intercept of -4.89, significant beta of 1.54 and a mean
absolute deviation (MAD) of 0.69 in a bivariate ordinary least squares (Henceforth: OLS)
regression, while the measure from Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge (1995) only got
respectively 2.15, 1.15 and 0.98 in a similar regression (Gabel and Huber, 2000, p. 99).
But what are the implications for social inquiry?
The interpretations of correlations seem to be in the eye of the beholder. Recently the
MCSS measure based on CMP was released, and its validity was confirmed by showing
higher correlation with CHESS than the other CMP measures – Vanilla and Rile. It was
concluded that MCSS “differ substantially from alternative measures derived from the
manifesto data but are more in line with expert survey data” (Ko¨nig et al., 2013, p. 16).
This conclusion was drawn the year after the CHESS trend file, based on correlations
with the CMP data, had concluded that “[o]verall, the analyses suggest relatively high
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levels of common structure across the different measures.” (Bakker et al., 2012, p. 11).
There seems to be no standard for “high”, “low”, “good” or “bad” correlation. The
result is that we are presented with estimates of correlations, but it does not inform us
of anything when we want to recommend one measure over the other.
This is why a construct validation is in order. A tool that can predict real world
observable phenomenons is a better representation of reality than a tool that fails to do
so. By comparing which measure is best at predicting the social phenomenons that
our theories suggests that these measures should be able to predict, we get an informed
comparison of the different measures’ utility for social inquiry. It does not provide any
final answer, but it will aid scholars when they need to choose measures for hypothesis
testing.
Chapter 3
Research Design
If I give you my data, isn’t there
a chance that you will find out
that I’m wrong and tell
everyone? Yes.
Gary King
In this chapter I will do three things.1 First, I aim to explain how the different left-
right measures were merged with the replication data. Second, I defend that listwise
deletion is the correct response to missing data in this analysis, even though imputation
is to be recommended in most other statistical analyses. Last, I defend that the main
analysis used in this thesis, the K-fold cross validation method, is a simple yet powerful
test of models’ predictive power.
3.1 Data
This thesis is made possible by the “Parliament and Government composition database”
(Henceforth: ParlGov) from Do¨ring and Manow (2012). It is a large documentation of
the traits of different party systems since 1945, and earlier for some countries. It includes
all parties (1400), elections (680) and governments (960) for 38 countries. It maps how
parties change party names, which helps to avoid coding errors due to insignificant name
changes. It includes party IDs for many of the different left-right measures used in this
analysis, information on which parties sat in government, and which were in opposition.
The three replicated articles all provide their replication data, but only Williams
(2011) includes identification of the parties to the corresponding left-right measure. The
two other include the point in time which the relevant phenomenon in the dependent
variable took place. I used ParlGov to identify the party systems at this point in time.
New cabinets are defined in line with the rest of the literature as
1Chapter quote from Gary King’s “Replication, Replication” 1995, p. 451
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(I) any change in the set of parties holding cabinet membership; (II) any
change in the identity of the prime minister; (III) any general election; (IV)
any substantively meaningful resignation. Do¨ring and Manow 2012.
For each party, I then merged the party with each of the data sets containing the various
left-right measures. For each party at the different points in time, I use the temporally
most proximate measurement.2
The relevant merge IDs are provided by ParlGov for the manifesto and expert survey
based measures in this thesis. For the mass-surveys, I created the IDs. The ParlGov
homepage provides thorough information on party changes, different names and links to
other data sets (Do¨ring and Manow, 2012). In cases where the mass-survey documenta-
tion only provided abbreviations which could match several of the parties in a system, the
necessary information (election results, name changes, history e.g.) was usually available.
If I could not be certain about which party ID would be correct after investigating, the
party was coded as missing.
The database use a conservative definition for parties and keep the same ID for split-
ting parties. This is different from for example the CMP data, where parties are coded at
the election level. Since ParlGov provides the necessary merge keys, this does not pose
an issue (Holger Do¨ring, personal correspondence).
When creating ranges or medians for the different replications, the measures are re-
quired to have no missing observations. For example, when creating the range within
government for the replication of Martin and Vanberg (2003), the range is unknown if
the position of any of the government parties is unknown. The same goes for the median
parliamentary position for the replication of Williams (2011).
3.1.1 Missing
Missing values occurs when a measure do not have any measurements of a party. The best
response to missing values in time-series cross-section data is to use a multiple imputation
model and exchange missing cells with predicted values (see for example Honaker and
King 2010). However, this is not viable in this setting. If I “invented” party positions
for all missing parties, it would be hard to evaluate the quality of the different measuring
methods. The performance of a measure with low coverage could become more dependent
upon on the imputation method instead of the measuring method.
In this analysis, there is no other solution than listwise deletion, despite its flaws.
The assumption for listwise deletion is that missing values are generated completely at
random. This is certainly not true. Missing data tend to cluster in time. Newer left-
right measures lack old parties that are no longer existing, and vice-versa. In addition,
missing cluster by country when whole party systems are not covered by a measure.
Listwise deletion will cause biased standard errors (Honaker and King, 2010, p. 564).
Even though it is the right thing to do in this evaluation, imputation would be a better
strategy when the measures are used for standard hypothesis testing.
2I tested with different interpolations, but the results differed very little.
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Missing values is a real issue in a world with resource constraints, something any
analyst must take it into account when choosing data. Whether the result of a measuring
method is a crude measure or a low coverage does not matter; both are equally useless
for causal assessment. As the next chapter will show, missing data is a more important
source for error than the measurement methods. Therefore, missing data is a relevant
aspect of the different measures, and should be a part of their evaluation.
3.2 K-fold Cross-Validation
The K-fold cross-validation (Henceforth: K-fold CV) is the main analytical method used
in this thesis. It is a method that aims to investigate the out-of-sample predictive power
of a regression model (James et al., 2013, p. 181-86). The basic idea is simple: Divide
the data set into k “folds” (parts), with no observations overlapping. Use k-1 folds to
estimate the regression coefficients, and use these to predict the dependent variable in
the excluded fold. Repeat this process k -times, so that all folds have been predicted by
combination of the others. This is illustrated in figure 3.1.
5−Fold CV
Figure 3.1: The 5-fold cross-validation method. The regression is repeated five times,
excluding different folds of the data indicated in yellow. The response in the excluded part
is predicted by the coefficients from the included parts, marked in blue. Figure is copied
from James et al. 2013, p. 181
To summarize the predictive power of the model, it is typical to show some sort of
error between the true and the predicted outcomes. In this analysis, I use the mean
square root of the squared error (Henceforth: MRSE), which is the the mean absolute
distance between the predicted outcome and the true outcome. Formally, it is found by
MRSE =
1
n
n∑
i=1
√
(yi − fˆ(xi))2 (3.1)
where fˆ(xi) is the predicted outcome for the ith observation, and yi is the true outcome.
Small MRSE indicates better predictions (James et al., 2013, p. 29,30).
The method enables researchers to investigate how sensitive the model is to different
samples. The MRSEs within the different folds can uncover how the predictive power is
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dependent upon certain samples of data. The method can also produce a straightforward
comparable summary of the quality of the various models by averaging the MRSE for
each individual fold – often referred to as the “K-fold CV-estimate”.3 The K-fold CV
procedure can also be used for binomial outcomes, as in Franchino and Høyland (2009),
but with the number of misclassified observations instead of MRSE as a measure of model
power.
Since the different measures differ in their number of observations, I add a second step
to the analysis, where all data sets are reduced to the data set with the lowest coverage.
This is to minimize the impact of different observations. I do this by sampling this many
observations 100 times from the data sets of the 10 alternative measures. The K-fold
CV analysis is repeated on all 100 samples of each of the measures. If the data were
simply reduced to the size of the smallest data set, the results could be affected by which
sample was drawn. By repeating the process 100 times, the analysis avoids that any of
the measures suffers from an “unlucky” draw.
For example, the model from Martin and Vanberg (2003) investigates government
bargaining durations. Some cases are harder to predict, as for example the Dutch general
election in 1977, in which it took 205 days to negotiate a government – 178 days longer
than the mean duration in the data set. An unlucky draw would be a draw that includes
a series of hard cases, resulting in a higher MRSE. A measure that lacks several of the
hard cases however, will never experience this and thus benefit from low coverage. This
is avoided by repeating the process 100 times.
By the same logic, I use the most “lucky” draw – the lowest “5-fold CV-estimate”
– of the 100 samples to compare the results achieved across the 100 samples. Since the
distribution of mean MRSEs across the 100 draws will be affected by the content of the
complete data set it is drawn from, the most lucky draw ensures a higher equivalence
in the comparisons, and avoids punishing a measure for an accidentally unlucky sample.
Alternatively, a comparison between the most “unlucky” draws could have been carried
out to indicate which measure avoids the least precise results. However, missing observa-
tions is more prominent for parties and systems that are atypical. Measures like ESS and
CHESS have lower coverage because they focus on the typical representative democracies
in Europe. The measures from manifestos and EVSWVS, on the other hand, expands
the scope with more deviating cases which are harder to predict. The most “unlucky”
draw is more influenced by the distribution of missing data than the most lucky draw.
The most lucky draw is therefore a superior comparison of measurement validity.
For the models in Martin and Vanberg (2003) and Franchino and Høyland (2009),
which use left-right range within government, I remove all one-party governments from
each fold when they are predicted. In one-party governments, all measures have a range
of 0. Comparing these cases will therefore make the results between measures appear
more equal. When reducing the data sets 100 times, I therefore sample so that each data
set have an equal number of one-party and multi-party government observations.
In this thesis, I have chosen to use 5 folds. In theory, one may choose any number of
3Given by CV(k) =
1
k
k∑
i=1
MRSEi.
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folds, for example k = n, where each individual observation is predicted by all the others.
This is an inferior strategy because it would cause severe computational problems. For
example, in the K-fold CV analysis of Franchino and Høyland (2009), the data will be
reduced to 3777 observations. This is done 100 times for 11 different measures. Choosing
k = n would result in over 4 million regressions.4 Choosing five folds greatly reduce the
computational time. In addition, it has been shown that reducing the number of folds
only have minor impact on the prediction bias (James et al., 2013, p. 183-84).
To summarize, I will first execute the 5-fold CV analysis on each measure as they
are. Then I repeat this 100 times for each measure with reduced data sets. This gives a
robust comparison of the predictive power of the models without the need for dramatic
computational resources. The strategy is fit to maximize the equivalence between the
measures’ data sets so that the different results are caused by different measurement
methods of the left-right position. Doing both steps, and by comparing the MRSE within
folds, this design allows for investigation of the importance of different data content. This
is the best available strategy for the construct validation employed here.
44154700 = (11 · 3777) · 100
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Chapter 4
The Original Articles
Parliamentary democracy is the
world’s most popular political
project.
Kaare Strøm
In this chapter I will go through the three models replicated in this thesis, each in
three steps: First, I explain the relevant theory for the explanatory left-right variable.
Second, I show that the original model can be replicated correctly. Third, I illustrate the
descriptive statistics for the alternative left-right measures, and replicate the model using
these. With each model, I illustrate the effect of the relevant variable with simulated
predicted values (Brambor, Clark and Golder, 2006, p. 73,74). Before I get into the
individual articles, I give a general overview of the assembly confidence literature, and
why this was a suitable area to look for theories to replicate.1
The main message from the chapter is that insignificant results due to lack of data
is a much bigger issue than measuring wrongly. The tests should only be considered
as preliminary, since the replications differ in the number of observations. This will be
solved with the 5-fold CV analysis in chapter 5.
4.1 Assembly Confidence: A Most Likely Case
The assembly confidence literature revolves around parliamentary democracies, and how
and when parties will choose to cooperate in legislation. Specifically, it deals with the
relationship between cabinet and parliament. The main actors are political parties and
politicians. The scene of the play is the national assemblies, and the hypotheses are
manifold: Political careers, passing of bills, political parleys, coalition life-cycle etc.
There are three reasons for why this is an optimal case for evaluating party policy
positions. First, ideological party position is central in most of the associated theories
(Gehlbach 2013; Strøm et al. 2008).
1Chapter quote is from Kaare Strøm’s “Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies”,
2000, p. 1
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Second, the theories are highly developed. Studying the behaviour of political parties
in parliament is a political science-speciality, and dates back (at least) to Hotelling’s “Sta-
bility in Competition” from 1929. Today, this has evolved into a sophisticated theoretical
framework that covers several empirical implications (see for example Strøm et al. 2008;
Gehlbach 2013).
Last, there is good data coverage, and many of the associated variables are unam-
biguous. One of the possibles ditches for construct validation is low validity of other
variables in the causal hypothesis. In the assembly confidence literature, most variables
are straightforward, such as parties in parliament, seat share, minority cabinet, cabinet
duration etc. Arguably, the most ambiguous of the recurring variables is party ideology
(Chiba, Martin and Stevenson, 2014, p. 2).
I will replicate three models from the assembly confidence literature in order to test
the predictive power of the party position measures. These are well established studies
with quality (and available) data. They are gathered from different phases of a cabinet
life-cycle: duration of government bargaining, cabinet monitoring and vote of confidence.2
The three models require different scope and precision from the measures, summarized
in table 4.1. The replications differ in temporal and geographical scope, the scope of
national parties it is expected to measure, and at what precision the measure will be
tested. All of the models use some sort of ideological range, either between a subset of
Table 4.1: Overview of Replicated Theories
Bargaining Monitoring NCM
Period 1950 - 1990 1979 - 2004 1960 - 2008
Country 10 european countries 15 EU member states 20 countries
Level Government Government + Support Opposition
Precision Range Range Dist. from median
the parliamentary parties or from the median position. In the following, I explain the
three theories in sequence, present their descriptive statistics and replicate them using
the different left-right measures. These replications should be considered as preliminary
tests. They may inform us of whether or not different measures would yield substantially
different conclusions, but because of differences in data coverage, these replications can
not conclude on the quality of the measurement methods.
4.2 Government Bargaining: Martin and Vanberg
In “Wasting Time? The Impact of Ideology and Size on Delay in Coalition Formation”
Martin and Vanberg (2003) argue that ideological discrepancy between parties makes
coalition negotiations more difficult, resulting in longer bargaining duration. The con-
nection between these two phenomenons is so tight that Grofman and van Roozendaal
(1994, p. 159) used bargaining duration as a measure for political disagreement.
2Two models of government formation were also prepared, but the replication material were too poor.
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There are at least three theories for why ideological disparity should delay government
formation negotiations (Martin and Vanberg, 2003, p. 325-26). First, when party leaders
decide to enter coalitions, they must have the implicit support of the party members.
Party “leaders [...] are not the only decision makers whose preferences are central to
successful coalition bargaining.” (Martin and Vanberg, 2003, p. 325). It becomes harder
for leaders to anticipate what coalitions will be acceptable to the veto players of one’s own
and others’ parties as ideological distance between them grows. Ideologically proximate
parties are more likely to have cooperated in parliament before and thus be more familiar
with each other’s party dynamics. Furthermore, ideological distance may imply more
constituencies with larger variations, making it unfamiliar what sort of political pressure
the party leadership must deal with. “In short, there are strong reasons to suppose that
party leaders will be better able to judge which kinds of proposals are acceptable to
parties that are ideologically close to their own” (Martin and Vanberg, 2003, p. 325).
Party ideology may also matter because greater distance imply smaller ’winset’ - a
smaller set of policies that a sufficient majority of the parties will agree to. Thus a more
detailed agreement may be necessary in order to convince all coalition partners.
Last, delaying negotiations may be a way for parties to signal perseverance and loy-
alty to campaign promises or election programmes. Such signals becomes increasingly
important as ideological range grows because large compromises are unavoidable. Delays
may be a way to signal voters that the party leaders worked as hard as they could.
4.2.1 Original Method and Replication
Martin and Vanberg (2003) estimate a Cox proportional hazards model in order to inves-
tigate how different covariates affect the duration of government bargaining. Their data
consist of 203 governments from 10 countries between 1950 - 1993. 225 units are included
in the original data set, but the original authors lacked left-right range measures for 22
of these.
The Cox model is one of the “event history”-models, and more specifically a type of
duration-model.3 The results from a Cox-model are “hazard ratios“: The probability that
a unit will “end” at this time, given that it has “survived” (or lasted) until now (Stef-
fensmeier and Jones, 2004, p. 2,3,14,50). In duration models, the dependent variable is
the duration (for example number of days) before the event occurred. Such models avoid
unrealistic assumptions and wrong predictions that a linear model like OLS would pro-
duce. Since the duration can not take a negative value, assuming linearity could predict
(impossible) negative durations. The coefficients would be both inefficient, inconsistent
and biased (Long, 1997, p. 217,218).
The original results are correctly replicated in table 4.2.4 These results are equal
to model 3 on page 330 in the original article. The interesting covariate is “Range of
government”, coded as the absolute range between parties, using Vanilla as the left-
3More popular called “survival” models
4The original formula had countries coded as their first letters. This caused erroneous variance
estimators because Ireland and Italy and Norway and Netherlands were clustered as similar countries.
The mistake is replicated in table 4.2, but correcting it does not alter the substantial results.
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right measure. As this shows, increased ideological disagreement increases the bargaining
duration significantly at the conventional 5 %-level. Descriptive statistics for the rest of
the variables are available in appendix A.
Table 4.2: Replication of Martin and Vanberg, 2003
Covariates Beta
Post-Election -0.56
(0.17)
Previous Defeat -0.12
(0.23)
Continuation 1.15
(0.24)
Identifiability 0.14
(0.12)
Range of Government -0.24
(0.12)
Number of Government Parties 1.37
(0.13)
Number of Government Parties * ln(T) -0.49
(0.04)
Minority Government -0.47
(0.21)
Log-Likelihood -722
N 203
Notes: The original table can be found on page 330 in the article.
Standard errors in parentheses
4.2.2 Replication with other left-right measures
The distributions and descriptive statistics of ideological range using the alternative left-
right measures is available in figure 4.1. The large frequency of zeroes across all measures
are caused by one-party governments. Other than that, the distribution differs slightly,
some being more right-skewed than others.
Pairwise Pearson-correlations are illustrated in figure 4.2. Besides from the original
left-right variable from Martin and Vanberg (2003), Wordfish correlates the least with the
other variables. Their original analysis use the Vanilla-measure from Gabel and Huber
(2000). The correlation between their measure and my own Vanilla measure is 78, which
is the highest correlation for the original variable. At least three things could cause
a difference in these two. First, some of the government parties might not have been
identified perfectly. This can happen if they have noted different parties in government
at a given time than ParlGov (Do¨ring and Manow, 2012). Their replication data makes
it impossible to investigate this further. It could also be caused by different interpolation
methods, and different software when doing the factor analysis. As will be shown, this is
not a serious issue.
When replicating the model with the different measures, I employ the Weibull-model
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Figure 4.1: Descriptives of “Range of Government”, Martin and Vanberg 2003
instead of the Cox model. This is because the Cox model is unfit for prediction, since it
does not specify the baseline hazard, and therefore provides no intercept: It tells us how
covariates affect duration, but it is impossible to calculate expected duration lengths. The
Weibull-model is a possible alternative which makes this possible. It specifies the hazard
rate as monotonically decreasing or increasing, which fits well with the data (Steffensmeier
and Jones, 2004, p. 21,22,25-31,48-49). Changing to the Weibull-model does not alter
the substantial conclusions. A comparison is provided in appendix A.
In the main analysis in chapter 5, I also remove the interaction between the number of
coalition parties and the logarithm of bargaining duration, since the latter term is partly
what the models will try to predict. The interaction was originally included to avoid
violating the proportional hazard assumptions, that all covariates have an equal effect
on the duration at all time points. I specify the Weibull model as an accelerated failure
time model so that this will not be an issue (Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004, p. 24-27).
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Figure 4.2: Correlation between “Range of Government”-variables, Martin and Vanberg
2003
The effect of “Range of government” points in the same direction for all the 11 left-
right measures. This is shown in figure 4.3. This figure shows the simulated effect of
this covariate across 11 models. The simulated effect is found by drawing 1000 sam-
ples from the multivariate normal distribution, using the coefficients (β) as mean and
variance equal to the variance-covariance matrix of the model. This process gives more
precise uncertainty for the effect of ideological range, conditional on the value of the other
covariates (King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000, p. 349-50).
All figures show predicted values of bargaining duration (Y-axis) over the range of
values of the left-right range (X-axis) for a two-party majority government in a country
without continuation rule and all numeric variables at the median value at the first day
of bargaining. The black line is the point-estimate, and the red shaded area indicate the
95 % confidence intervals.
Considering the point estimates, most of the measures indicate a total increase of
about 5 bargaining days if the level of ideological range moves from its minimum value to
its maximum value. Vanilla and CMHIBL have a stronger effect within their full range.
If we consider the significance, only KimFording, Vanilla, MCSS and CMHIBL achieve
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Figure 4.3: Simulated predicted values of “Range of Government”, Martin and Vanberg
2003. X-axis is the range of the “Range of Government”-covariate. Y-axis is the predicted
number of bargaining days. 95 % confidence intervals in shaded red.
significance on the conventional 5 %-level.5 Furthermore, several measures do not guar-
antee a different predicted value at its minimum value compared to its maximum value.
This should not be given much importance in this test. The different measures differ in
their coverage. Using ESS instead of the original measure would have halved the num-
ber of observations. In addition, the models differs in which observations are included.
Some observations might be more important than others for the estimates. For example,
Wordfish has 185 observations and MCSS 172. But as can be seen in figure 4.1, Wordfish
5Some of the others turn significant at certain non-linear specifications.
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has a higher frequency of one-party governments among its observations, giving shorter
ideological ranges. This makes it harder to efficiently estimate higher values.
Establishing equivalent data sets is the task of chapter 5. In this replication, the
similarity of the patterns is more interesting. First, if any of the measures were not able
to tap the left-right dimension, the patterns should give more counter-intuitive results.
Neither does. Second, the figure tells us nothing of which measure provides the most
correct estimates. We do not know the true magnitude of the effect of ideological dis-
agreement. This as well will be better evaluated in chapter 5, when the predictive power
of the models will be put to the test.
Therefore, the main message from the replication of Martin and Vanberg (2003), is
that some measures would not provide the necessary data, but all measures would indicate
the same pattern: Ideological range between bargaining parties increase the duration of
the bargains. The result supports the notion that none of the left-right measures give
counter-intuitive results.
4.3 Coalition Monitoring: Franchino and Høyland
In coalition governments, there is a danger that individual ministers will diverge from
the coalition agreement for individual gain – a classic principal-agent problem. This
is possible because “parties have complete autonomy over the ministries they control”
(Gehlbach, 2013, p. 88). Among other things, ministers enjoy an information advantage
over their jurisdiction, and norms of ministerial responsibility discourages interference
from other cabinet ministers. Since political preferences between coalition partners di-
verge, ministers may exploit their position to implement policies in favour of their own
party at the expense of other coalition members. However, all members would prefer a
negotiated compromise to such ministerial drift (Thies, 2001, p. 584). To enforce such
compromises, behaviour must be monitored. The greater the ideological disparity in cab-
inet, the greater the need to monitor (Franchino and Høyland 2009; Gallagher et al. 2006,
p. 43; Martin and Vanberg 2004, 2005; Verzichelli 2008, p. 237).
There are different monitoring mechanism parties may use, as for example policy doc-
uments or junior ministers as ’watchdogs’ within jurisdiction (Martin and Vanberg 2004;
Verzichelli 2008, p. 259). In “Legislative Involvement in Parliamentary Systems: Op-
portunities, Conflict, and Institutional Constraints” from 2009, Franchino and Høyland
argue that the parliament can be used as such a mechanism. Legislatures in modern
democracies are “equipped with strong standing committees with broad information-
gathering tools capable of neutralizing the information advantage enjoyed by a minister”
(Franchino and Høyland, 2009, p. 609).
Their study is within the context of the EU, where they argue that the informa-
tion advantage is especially evident. This is because the minister may, in various ways,
have been involved in the process at the EU-level. Implementing the directive is the
responsibility of the respective minister. Some directives leave little room for national
manoeuvring, but for those that do, the need for coalition partners to monitor behaviour
is important. However, the benefit from intervening must be evaluated against its costs.
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As ideological divergence between partners grows, both the benefits and temptation of
ministerial drift and the cost for the victim increases, making parliamentary intervention
more worthwhile. And thus Franchino and Høyland (2009) finds evidence that parliamen-
tary involvement in transposition is more common the greater ideological range within
cabinet.
4.3.1 Original Method and Replication
The analysis from Franchino and Høyland (2009) utilize a multilevel probit model with
random intercept to investigate when the parliament is involved in the transposition of
EU legislation. The second level in the model is the different legislations from the EU,
which is similar for the EU-nations.
The probit model for binary outcomes is a way to model phenomenons with a latent
value from−∞ to∞, but where we can only observe two outcomes (Long, 1997, p. 40, 41).
For example, the latent distribution can be the probability for being in the labour force:
Two people can both be in the labour force, but with unequal probability. Parliamentary
involvement, the binary dependent variable in Franchino and Høyland (2009, p. 610-14),
follows an underlying interval variable with a normal cumulative distribution.
The multilevel structure was motivated by the fact that observations were not indepen-
dent. The directives explained a significant proportion of the variance in the probability
of parliamentary involvement (Franchino and Høyland, 2009, p. 415). Ignoring the mul-
tilevel structure would yield incorrect small standard errors and therefore increase the
possibility of a Type 1-error (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002, p. 219-20).
I have successfully replicated model 2 on page 616 in the original article in table 4.3
(Franchino and Høyland, 2009, p. 616).6 The important variable is “Conflict”, which
appears in no less than 7 interactions. It is coded as the range between the party of
the responsible minister, to the most extreme governing or supporting party, using the
left-right variable from Ray-Marks-Steenbergen, the precursor for CHESS (Ray 1999;
Steenbergen and Marks 2007). We see that ceteris paribus, increased ideological range
increase the probability for parliamentary involvement, and this is statistically significant
on the 5 %-level. Descriptive statistics for the various variables are available in appendix
B.
4.3.2 Replication with other left-right measures.
In recreating the “Conflict”-variable, I could not completely replicate the process adopted
by Franchino and Høyland (2009). In the original measure, they use the range from the
party of the minister responsible for the transposition, to the most distant coalition
partner. For minority governments, they use the range between the government party
and the most distant supporting party. These data were acquired from European Journal
of Political Research (EJPR), Mu¨ller and Strøm (2000) and Woldendorp, Keman and
Budge (2011). Where data was not available, they assumed that the closest party was
the supporting party.
6Without robust standard errors for countries. This does not affect the substantial results.
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Table 4.3: Replication of Franchino and Høyland, 2009
Parameters Beta S.E.
Intercept -2.47 0.305
Conflict 5.453 1.388
Council 0.282 0.121
Complexity 0.118 0.089
Deadline Years 0.233 0.056
Agenda Control -0.51 0.201
Amendment Prerogatives 0.32 0.053
Confidence Vote -0.05 0.045
Bicameralism -0.057 0.046
Cabinet Turnover -0.015 0.005
Environment 0.419 0.151
Finance 1.553 0.208
Industry 0.53 0.109
Interior 1.575 0.381
Public administration 1.317 0.388
Public Health 0.94 0.49
Social affairs 0.704 0.23
Transport 0.091 0.14
Conflict X Council 2.126 0.498
X Complexity -0.516 0.345
X Deadline length 0.151 0.223
X Agenda control -0.767 0.916
X Amendment prerogatives -1.676 0.269
X Confidence Vote -0.632 0.205
X Bicameralism 0.333 0.23
Variance, Intercept 0.566 0.752
Log-Likelihood -1813.207
Notes: The original table can be found on page 616 in the article.
Dependent variable is parliamentary involvement.
Level 1 N = 6089, Level 2 N = 724
Easy accessible data from these sources is not available, neither for portfolio allocation
nor supporting parties. Gathering the relevant data is therefore not possible within the
time-frame of writing this master thesis. Instead, I utilize the range within the coalition.
For minority governments, I utilize the range between the government and the most
distant party needed to achieve 50 % of the seats in parliament.
Descriptive information of the different measures is presented in figure 4.4, and the
correlation between them in figure 4.5.7 In all measures there is a tendency in the direction
of right-skewness, and a large number of zeroes caused by one-party governments.
Pairwise Pearson’s correlations are reported in figure 4.5. As should be expected,
the original variable used by Franchino and Høyland (2009) correlates the most with its
successor CHESS. The lowest correlation, 36, is between the original and ESS.
There are large differences between the number of observations across the models.
7To ease presentation, Vanilla, KimFording and the original measure were multiplied by 10.
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Figure 4.4: Descriptives for “Conflict” measures, Franchino and Høyland 2009
Wordfish, with the lowest coverage, only have 3950 of the original 6089 observations. But
also CHESS, Eurobarometer, ESS and EVSWVS have less than 5000 observations. This
causes several of the parameters to become more uncertain.
I show only one simulated effect from the results, which is typical for the model as
a whole. The standard result tables are available in appendix B, but are for the most
part uninformative as they only show the effect and standard error for the variables when
all other constitutive terms in the interactions are equal to zero (Brambor et al., 2006,
p. 73,74). Simulated effects are needed to show the effect across the whole scale of the
”Conflict” variable conditional on the value of the other variables (King et al., 2000,
p. 349-50). To show the effect of all 7 interactions across 11 measures would take up to
much space. The main message is that the three interactions that are significant in the
original analysis; council, amendment prerogatives and confidence vote, all have the same
pattern across all models, but the significance is lost in several of the models. Here, I
illustrate only the interaction with council involvement.
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Figure 4.5: Correlation between “Conflict”-variables, Franchino and Høyland 2009
This is done in figure 4.6. The simulations are made as if all numeric variables were
at their median value. The solid line with red confidence interval is a simulation where
the directive comes from the EU commission. The dashed line with green confidence
intervals is a simulation where the directive is from the EU council. The authors note
that a “striking aspect is [...] that the effect is substantially much weaker for Commission
than for Council directives” (Franchino and Høyland, 2009, p. 615).
This conclusion is repeatedly confirmed across most measures. The exceptions are
EVSWVS, CMHIBL and Eurobarometer. These models do indicate a stronger effect of
ideological range when directives are issued by the council, but it is not significantly
different from the effect under commission-directives. ESS and Wordfish confirms the
effect, but fails to distinguish the two at higher levels of ideological conflict where coverage
is lower.
To summarize, the probit model from Franchino and Høyland (2009) is demanding,
and lower data coverage impedes estimation. Since the models differ in their observations,
the results do not establish the needed equivalence to conclude that differences are caused
by different measurement methods. Yet all measures do seem to indicate a pattern in
line with theory: Increased ideological distance increases the probability that parliament
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Figure 4.6: Simulated predicted values of “Conflict”, Franchino and Høyland 2009. X-axis
is the range of the “Conflict”-variable. Y-axis is the predicted probability for parliamen-
tary involvement. Shaded areas indicate 95 % confidence intervals. Commission-directives
in solid and red, Council-directives in dashed and green.
will be used for monitoring. This effect is conditional on several other variables. None of
the measures contradicts this theory.
4.4 No-Confidence motions: Williams
Only 5 % of all no-confidence motions (henceforth: NCMs) result in government termi-
nation. This is the starting point in Laron K. Williams’ “Unsuccessful Success? Failed
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No-Confidence Motions, Competence Signals, and Electoral Support” from 2011. His
goal is to rationalize why parties still choose to issue NCMs.
A key assumption is that voters hold leaders accountable for policy performance.
Voters do not have full information over performance nor what it is reasonable to hold
the different political actors accountable for. Several “contingency dilemmas” distorts
information. A NCM allows the opposition to name and shame a particular policy as bad
performance. As such, NCM is a tool for opposition parties to “influence the electorate’s
perception of the opposition party’s ability to govern relative to the current government.”
(Williams, 2011, p. 1480). This is supported by the media coverage that accompanies such
events. Thus, NCMs are not about the short-term benefit of removing the government,
but a long-term investment in votes.
There is a credibility cost involved for the opposition. For the signal to be effective,
the opposition party must appear as a credible alternative. Otherwise, it may just as well
be perceived as political “cheap talk”. Moderate parties are more likely to occupy the
median position. Since any ideologically continuous majority coalition must include the
median position, this puts moderate parties in a better bargaining position (Gehlbach,
2013, p. 1 - 22). Parties in the center are therefore more credible alternatives. Williams
(2011) show that the further from the median the opposition party is, the less benefit the
party gains from issuing NCMs.
4.4.1 Original Method and Replication
Williams estimate four different OLS regressions to estimate how NCMs affect election
results. The fourth of these models estimates change in votes for opposition parties, which
is the dependent variable. The interesting explanatory variable is ideological extremism,
coded as the absolute distance between a party’s position on Rile and 0. Extremism
appears in interaction terms with both the number of NCMs against the government and
number of NCMs against the government by the given party (Williams, 2011, p. 1489).
Descriptives for the variables are available in the appendix C.
OLS is the most basic of regression models. It is linear, meaning that one scalar point
change in the independent variable changes the dependent variable by β, irrespective of
the current level of the dependent variable (Long, 1997, p. 3-5).
The model is correctly replicated in table 4.4. The original model can be found on
page 1489 in the original article. It should be noted that Williams’ significant tests are
one-tailed (Williams, 2011, p. 1489). Statistically significant results at the conventional
5 %-level are therefore achieved if the beta divided by the standard error is equal to or
larger than +/- 1.645, as with a significance test at the 10 %-level. The interaction term
with the number of party NCMs achieves about -1.8, and would have failed a standard
two-tailed hypothesis test.
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Table 4.4: Replication of Laron K. Williams, 2011
Independent Variable Beta S.E.
Constant 0.588 0.302
No. of NCMs agains govt. -0.198 0.081
No. of NCMs by that party 0.717 0.309
Real GDP per capita growth -0.128 0.053
Majority govt. 0.65 0.263
No. of govt. parties -0.046 0.092
Lagged vote share 0.013 0.009
Ideological extremism -0.006 0.009
Extremism x Govt. NCMs 0.004 0.002
Extremism x Party NCMs -0.02 0.011
N 693
Adj. R Squared 0.022
Notes: Robust Standard Errors clustered
by country to control for heteroscedasticity.
Significance tests in the original article are one-tailed
4.4.2 Replication with other left-right measures
Since not all the measures have a natural center, I changed the operationalization of
the extremism variable to be the distance from the median percentage. Specifically, I
duplicated each party’s row by the rounded number of percentage votes they got each
election. For each election, I extract the median position of all parties in that election – the
position of the median percentage. Extremism is measured as the absolute distance from
this median. This operationalization is in line with Williams’ (2011, p. 1493) theory that
“[m]oderate parties are in a better bargaining position because they typically occupy the
median position in the system and are therefore featured in more coalition alternatives”
(my emphasis).
In addition, the ParlGov-database does not include Israel. The country must therefore
be omitted from the replication since the necessary IDs needed to merge the different left-
right measures are unavailable.
The distribution and descriptive statistics of these variables are illustrated in figure
4.7.8 By comparing the original variable and Rile, we see that my operationalization
allows for more extreme parties. By definition, most parties lie closest to the median
position percentage.
More intriguing are the pairwise Pearson’s correlations, illustrated in figure 4.8. Word-
fish does not correlate at all with the original extremism variable. In general, correlations
between the measures are lower for this analysis than in the preceding replications. The
most similar measures are those from mass-surveys. Even Vanilla and Rile only achieves
a correlation of .66.
It is possible that the low correlations are due to the intermediate step of creating
a median, magnifying the dissimilarities for each step: If the measures only correlate
8Vanilla has been multiplied by 10 to improve presentation
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Figure 4.7: Descriptives for Extremism, Williams 2011
moderately in the first place, then the medians are likely to correlate only moderately.
The distance between the position and the median then might amplify the original discord.
The results from the different replications can be seen in figure 4.9. The simulations
are set as if during a majority, one-party government, and the rest of the variables at their
mean values. The solid line with red shaded 95 % confidence intervals is the simulated
predicted values over the range of extremism for a party that have issued no NCMs, and
no NCMs have been issued against the government in the period. The dashed line with
green confidence intervals is the predicted values over the range of extremism, for a party
that have issued 3 NCMs against the government, and these are all the NCMs issued
against that government in the period.
The most striking observation is the uncertainty in the model. When reported with
95 % confidence intervals, the effect in the original model also loses its significance. The
predicted value for a median party whom have issued 3 NCMs may be as low as -2.5 %
change in support. Had the party been as extreme as possible, the predicted value could
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Figure 4.8: Correlation Between Extremism, Williams 2011
still have been +2.5% change in votes. Between the models, differences in certainty seems
first and foremost to be a result of the number of observations.
When looking at the point estimates, most of the models indicate the correct result:
the more extreme the party, the less it pays off in votes to issue NCMs. Moving from the
least to the most extreme position reduces the expected change in votes by about 2.5 %.
This however, is not the result from CHESS, EVSWVS and Eurobarometer, where being
extreme is a good thing the more NCMs you have issued. However, this should not be
taken as empirical proof against the quality of their measurement methods, as these data
contain less than half of the original data set.
Wordfish is no different than the others: the point-estimate indicate the correct pat-
tern, but the confidence intervals makes it hard to evaluate if this is statistically signif-
icant, as the data with Wordfish only have 68 % of the original data. But automated
computer coding certainly does not stand out as especially bad.
Again, due to differences in observations, the equivalence needed to determine how
the measurement methods affect the results is not achieved. But if one wish to replicate
the results from Williams (2011), one needs first and foremost a measure with abundant
data.
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Figure 4.9: Simulated predicted values of “Extremism”, Williams 2011. X-axis is the
range of the “Extremism”-variable. Y-axis is the predicted change in votes. Shaded areas
indicate 95 % confidence intervals. Simulation with 0 NCMs in solid and red, simulation
with 3 NCMs in dashed and green.
4.5 Summary of Preliminary Results
The three articles have been replicated with all the alternative measures, and the sim-
ulated effects have been illustrated. There are two relevant patterns across all three
models. First, no measure systematically contradicts the tested theories or the other
measures. This suggests that they all tap the same underlying phenomenon.
Second, if one is looking to get results that are significant at the conventional 5 %-level,
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one should first and foremost choose a measure that maximizes the number of observa-
tions. In this respect, the sources differ. Expert judgements and mass surveys will never
be able to go back in time to get older measures. The hand-coded manifesto measures
may all go back in time as long as the necessary text are available. But the cheapest
method would be to use automated computer codes, here represented by Wordfish.
The evidence so far does not tell us anything about which measure gives the most
precise results, since we do not know which effect magnitude is most ”correct”. Neither
have they established the necessary equivalence needed to conclude on the quality of the
measurement methods. This is the goal of the next chapter, where the measures will
be reduced to equal size, and their predictive power will be used as a benchmark for
measurement quality.
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Chapter 5
Prediction results
Only predictive models are
scientific.
Philip A. Schrodt
In this chapter, I undertake two steps on each of the three replicated models.1 First,
I do a 5-fold CV analysis on the data sets of each of the 10 alternative measures, plus
the original. Second, I reduce the data sets to the size of the smallest data set through
listwise deletion of randomly selected observations and then run the 5-fold CV analysis.
This is repeated 100 times in order to avoid especially unlucky samples: Since different
data set sizes also imply different content, for example different party systems, outliers or
other traits that affect their “representativeness”, doing listwise deletion only once could
make a measure randomly end up with a composition of observations that is harder to
predict, resulting in higher MRSE than other samples of the observations. This will also
be illustrated in the following sections. Repeating the process 100 times allows each
measure to show its best side. Comparing the results for both the full and reduced data
sets also allows for an evaluation of how important data content is for predictive power.
The results will be presented with my interpretations.
5.1 Bargaining Duration
In the bargaining model from Martin and Vanberg (2003), the dependent variable was
the duration of government bargains measured in days. When no adjustments are made
to the data sets, there are noticeable differences in predictive power. In figure 5.1, the
y-axis indicate the MRSE and the coloured marks note the mean MRSE for the five folds
– the 5-fold CV-estimate. The measures are aligned along the x-axis, ordered by the
number of valid predictions, which is noted in parentheses. The size of the mark is scaled
as the number of predicted observations as a share of the full data set and multiplied
by 5. Since one-party governments are removed from the predictions, these numbers do
1Chapter quote from Philip A. Schrodt’s “Seven Deadly Sins of Contemporary Quantitative Political
Science”, 2014, p. 291
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not correspond to the data set size. Circles, squares and diamonds indicate respectively
manifesto-, expert or mass survey based measures. The grey vertical lines ranges from
the minimum to the maximum MRSE of the individual folds for each measure.
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Figure 5.1: MRSE in the full data sets, Martin and Vanberg 2003. The Y-axis is the
MRSE. The x-axis indicate the different measures, ordered by the number of valid pre-
dictions. Circles, squares and diamonds indicate respectively manifesto-, expert or mass
survey based measures. The coloured mark is the 5-fold CV estimate, and the size of
the mark is scaled as the number of predicted observations as a share of the full data
set multiplied by 5. The colors are ment to ease comparison of the results. The number
of predicted observations is noted in parentheses. The grey vertical lines range from the
minimum to the maximum MRSE of the individual folds for each measure.
Looking at the sources, we see that all mass surveys, EVSWVS, Eurobarometer and
ESS, performs the best, while the difference between manifestos and expert surveys are
only minor, missing by 18 - 19 days on average. Wordfish has the fourth best results, and
better than its hand-coded siblings. Notice that CMHIBL gets the highest mean MRSE,
and had the largest magnitude in the simulated effects in the replication; a stronger
magnitude is not necessarily more correct.
Rile, KimFording and Vanilla have the same observations and are therefore equivalent
in all respects. The only difference between these three is the measure. This figure is
therefore an informative comparison of these three measures. Of the three, Rile performs
best, and Vanilla worst. As we shall see, this difference is probably coincidental for this
analysis.
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There is a certain tendency that measures with fewer observations perform better,
but CHESS and CMHIBL contradict this trend. EVSWVS gets the lowest mean MRSE,
more than a day lower than the second place ESS. Eurobarometer is not far behind, and
have have 48 more predicted observations than ESS. It is not only the sheer size of n that
matters, but also its content and the measuring methods.
In general, the original authors could have increased their predictive power by three
days by changing to EVSWVS. Nonetheless, it would also imply that 57 observations
could not be predicted at all. Furthermore, if these 57 observations are harder cases
to predict, and this is what determines the difference in MRSE, then changing measure
would not increase prediction power, only reduce prediction possibilities.
Data content does account for much of the differences. Looking at the vertical lines
indicating the range of the MRSE across the 5 folds, there are clearly large differences
depending on the composition of observations within each fold. This is especially promi-
nent for analyses with fewer observations in total. The maximum MRSE value of ESS is
five times the size of the minimum MRSE.
ESS has the least non-missing observations for multi-party governments, with 50
observations. CHESS has the least one-party governments, with 43 observations. To
minimize the impact of the data content, I draw 93 valid observations for each of the
measures: 50 multi party and 43 one party governments. To avoid “unlucky” or biased
samples, this process is repeated 100 times, and the K-fold analysis is done on each
sample.
The results are illustrated in figure 5.2. 5-fold CV-estimates are noted along the y-
axis, and the respective measures along the x-axis. The large coloured marks indicate
the most lucky draw, and a horizontal black line is drawn to ease the comparison of
between these. The 5-fold CV-estimate from the remaining 99 draws for each measure
are indicated as black marks.
Eurobarometer now achieves the best results, a lucky draw which on average is one
day more precise than the second place, Wordfish. The difference between the worst
(ESS) and the best (Eurobarometer) result is quite equal as with the full data; about 5
days.
Since ESS and CHESS decided the number of observations, these will naturally have
less variation than the others. This goes especially for ESS, which had the lowest num-
ber of multi-party governments: The same observations are predicted 100 times, but in
different folds and with different observations estimating the coefficients.
For the hand coded manifestos Rile, KimFording and Vanilla, the latter now achieves
the best result. This performed worst in the full data. As mentioned, these three have
identical observations. Their difference in quality seems to be more or less random varia-
tion depending on the included observations. The main story is that they are equal. The
last of the hand coded measures, MCSS, is just about equal to these with the reduced
data.
All measures are more precise with fewer data: The worst luckiest draw in the reduced
data (ESS) is about equally as good the best (EVSWVS) MRSE in the analysis with full
data. This indicates that while the standard errors of the coefficients is expected to
increase with fewer observations, the point-estimates are not necessarily more biased.
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Figure 5.2: 5-fold CV-estimates across 100 samples, Martin and Vanberg 2003. The y-
axis is the value of the 5-fold CV-estimate. The x-axis is the respective measure. Circles,
squares and diamonds indicate respectively manifesto-, expert or mass survey based mea-
sures. The large coloured marks indicate the most lucky draw. The colours and horizontal
black line are meant to ease the comparison of the most lucky draws. The remaining 99
draws for each measure are indicated as black marks.
With the second place, Wordfish is neither best nor worst. As will be shown, this
is the story for all the replicated studies. In this bargaining model, it improves the
average prediction precision by about a day compared to the other manifesto measures
and a little less compared to the expert surveys. Wordfish’s, CMHIBL’s, CHESS’ and
Eurobarometer’s most lucky draws are somewhat outliers. The second best draw equalizes
the results further.
The results indicate that prediction error may be reduced by several days by switching
to a measure with lower coverage. Moving from the original measure to Eurobarometer
would increase precision by 4 days, which is enough to notice. But it would also entail to
lose about 20 % of the data. Wordfish however, would be only one day less precise than
Eurobarometer and keep 90 % of the original data. With a little additional effort, the
remaining 18 observations could be obtained as well. If we consider the next best draw,
the difference in predictive power between Wordfish and Eurobarometer vanishes.
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5.2 Coalition Monitoring
In the coalition monitoring model from Franchino and Høyland (2009), the dependent
variable was whether or not national parliaments where involved in the transposition of
EU legislation. In the full data set, national parliaments are involved in only 14 % of the
transpositions. In general, it is easy for the coalition monitoring model to predict which
cases do not experience parliamentary involvement, but hard to predict the cases that
do. This results in small differences between the models, as shown in figure 5.3.
The y-axis represents the share of wrong predictions in the 11 models. In it, out-
comes with a predicted probability larger than 0.52 are expected to have parliamentary
involvement, otherwise they are not. The coloured marks indicate the share of wrong
predictions across the 5-folds, and the sizes are adjusted to the proportion of valid pre-
dictions compared to the full data set, multiplied by 5. The grey horizontal lines above
and beneath the circles indicate the maxmimum and minimum value among the 5 folds.
EVSWVS and ESS have the least wrong predictions, a share of 0.1 each. CHESS has
the most wrong predictions, but the share is still only 0.13; a difference of only 0.02 from
the best measure.
Given the similarities in the predicted outcomes, figure 5.4 instead illustrates the
predicted probabilities. In it, all the predicted units within each model are noted as black
and grey circles. Black circles are units where the parliament was involved, grey circles
are units in which they were not. Their position on the y-axis indicates their predicted
probability. The green line across is the mean predicted probability for all units in which
the parliament was involved. The red line is the mean predicted probability for all units
where the parliament was not involved. The shaded area indicate the 95 % confidence
intervals for the respective means.
To give correct predictions, we want to push the green line and black circles to the top,
and the red line and grey circles to the bottom. In the interpretations, this is my basis.
However, this is somewhat of a misuse of the probit model. As mentioned in section 4.3,
the probit assumes that the observations follow some unobservable underlying probability.
Thus, a unit with parliamentary involvement may have had a probability of only 0.53 for
this outcome. Since we can not observe this probability, neither can we assess how far the
predictions are from the true value. I therefore assume that most scholars would want
to maximize the predicted probability for outcomes where the parliament was involved,
and minimize the probability for outcomes where it was not.
Differences are minor even for the predicted probabilities. Rile, KimF, Vanilla and
Wordfish keep the green line somewhat higher than the rest. The original measure,
using the combined Steenbergen-Marks-Ray data set (Ray 1999; Steenbergen and Marks
2007), and Eurobarometer have the lowest mean predicted probability for units with
parliamentary involvement.
There is even less variation among the red line. Wordfish, ESS and EVSWVS have a
somewhat lower mean for the outcomes in which parliaments were not involved. In this
model however, a scholar would probably be more interested in maximizing the green
2Other thresholds were tested, but they did not alter the substantial conclusions.
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Figure 5.3: Share of wrong predictions across 11 measures, Franchino and Høyland 2009.
The y-axis indicate the share of wrong predictions (to magnify differences it ranges only
from 0.05 - 0.15). The different measures are aligned along the x-axis, ordered by the num-
ber of valid predictions. Circles, squares and diamonds indicate respectively manifesto-,
expert or mass survey based measures. The coloured marks indicate the share of false
predictions across the 5 folds. Sizes are adjusted to the proportion of valid predictions of
the full data set multiplied by 5. The colours are ment to ease comparison of the results.
The grey horizontal lines indicate the maxmimum and minimum value among the 5 folds.
line, than minimizing the red, since it is harder to correctly predict when the parliament
is involved.
This is again confirmed by the predicted probabilities for the individual folds, illus-
trated in figure 5.5. The x-axis now represents the 5-folds, otherwise these figures are
equal to figure 5.4 without the observations. The first fold in Eurobarometer seems to
have a lower than usual mean predicted probability for units with parliamentary involve-
ment. This could be the reason for their lower mean in figure 5.4, and could be caused by
the random composition of the folds. Other than that, the pattern is quite stable around
0.4. The model seems to be remarkably robust to different data content.
The data set with Wordfish has the lowest number of one-party governments, with 461
observations. EVSWVS has the lowest number of multi-party governments, with 3316
observations. The 11 data sets are therefore reduced to 3777 observations 100 times, with
this division of multi-party and one-party governments.
The results from these 100 samples are summarized in figure 5.6. The y-axis indicate
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Figure 5.4: Predicted probabilities from Franchino and Høyland 2009. The y-axis notes
the predicted probabilities, and the x-axis indicate the models. The green line is the mean
for responses where the parliament was involved, and the red line is the mean for responses
in which it was not. Shaded areas indicate the 95 % confidence intervals for the respective
means. Black circles are units where the parliament was involved, grey circles are units
in which they were not.
the number of false predictions, and the respective measures are aligned along the x-axis.
The coloured marks indicate the most lucky draw. The horizontal black line is meant
to ease the comparison of the most lucky draws. The black marks are the remaining
99 draws for each measure. The number of cases with parliamentary involvement in the
most lucky sample is noted in parentheses.
Rile predicts 0.003 less precise than KimF, and Vanilla 0.001 more precise than KimF.
As noted, these three consist of identical observations, and are equivalent in all aspects
except for the left-right measures. By the margins, Vanilla is performs best both in the
full and reduced data set.
Wordfish has the lowest share of wrong predictions, with Eurobarometer right behind,
but the differences are too minor to give significant weight. The difference between the
best and worst score across the measures is 0.02. The number of outcomes with parlia-
mentary involvement differs between the data sets, which impairs the equivalence. The
model struggles more with the prediction of these outcomes than when the parliament
is not involved. 0.02 may simply be a result of this property, and not the measurement
methods. The most lucky draw from Wordifsh and Eurobarometer have fewest observa-
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Figure 5.5: Predicted probabilities and their means for individual folds, Franchino and
Høyland 2009. The y-axis notes the predicted probabilties, and the x-axis indicate the
individual folds. The green line is the mean for responses where the parliament was
involved, and the red line is the mean for responses in which it was not. Shaded areas
indicate the 95 % confidence intervals for the respective means. Notice that y-axis ranges
from 0 - 0.5.
tions with parliamentary involvement.
In figure 5.7, the mean predicted probabilities for the two outcomes across the 11
measures are illustrated. The green area with corresponding vertical lines indicates the
maximum and minimum mean predicted probability for cases where the parliament was
involved in the transposition. The red line is identical for cases where the parliament was
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Figure 5.6: Share of erroneous predictions across 100 samples, Franchino and Høyland
2009. The y-axis notes the number of false prediction, and the x-axis indicate the respec-
tive measures. The coloured marks indicate the most lucky draw. Circles, squares and
diamonds indicate respectively manifesto-, expert or mass survey based measures. The
colours and horizontal black line is to ease the comparison of the most lucky draws. The
black circles are the remaining 99 draws for each measure. Notice that the y-axis only
ranges between 0.05 - 0.15 in order to amplify the differences. The number of cases with
parliamentary involvement in the most lucky sample is noted in parentheses.
not involved.
The green line is definitely the most interesting as it contains higher variation, and
the model struggles more to predict these cases. In addition, the lowest value on the
red line is not necessarily from the same sample as the highest value on the green line.
A lower mean probability on the red line may just as well correspond to a lower value
also on the green line. Looking at the variation on the different lines, the average scholar
should be interested in maximizing the green line, even if this could also imply a minor
increase on the red line.
Vanilla has a higher maximum mean predicted probability for cases with parliamen-
tary involvement than Rile and KimFording. Interestingly, it also have a lower minimum
mean predicted probability. It seems thus to be less stable in its predictions compared
to the other two. KimFording on the other hand, achieves a lower mean predicted prob-
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Figure 5.7: Mean predicted probabilities across 100 samples, Franchino and Høyland 2009.
The green area indicate maximum and minimum mean predicted probability for cases
where the parliament was involved. The red area indicate maximum and minimum mean
predicted probability for cases where the parliament was not involved. Circles, squares and
diamonds indicate respectively manifesto-, expert or mass survey based measures. Notice
that the y-axis only ranges between 0 - 0.5
ability for cases where the parliament was not involved.
Five measures, Vanilla, MCSS, EVSWVS, Eurobarometer and Wordfish achieve a
maximum mean predicted probability for cases with parliamentary involvement of about
0.45. Eurobarometer has the best result across all 100 samples for both parliamentary
involvement and non-involvement. The minimum mean predicted probability for par-
liamentary involvement for Eurobarometer, is equal to the maximum mean predicted
probability for Rile, KimFording, CHESS and the original measure in the article. Con-
tradictory to the results with the full data sets, these results are in favour of Eurobarom-
eter. This measure also achieved the lowest number of erroneous predictions, together
with Wordfish, as shown in figure 5.6.
CHESS and its predecessor, the original measure from Ray-Marks-Steenbergen (Ray
1999; Steenbergen and Marks 2007), achieves lowest mean predicted probabilities for
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these cases with parliamentary involvement.
Both the share of wrong predictions and the predicted probabilities supports the
hypothesis that Wordfish is measuring the same phenomenon as the other measures. It
is not more precise than the others, but neither is it worse. An analyst could have chosen
any of these 11 measures without drastic implications for predictive power. It could
however, have drastic implications for the number of missing data, and thus the ability
to predict.
5.3 No-Confidence motions
In the NCM-model from Williams (2011), the dependent variable is change in votes for
the respective opposition party. All the models’ K-fold CV estimate miss within 2 - 3
percentage points. This is visualized in figure 5.8. The coloured mark indicate the 5-
fold CV-estimate, and is scaled as valid observations as share of the full data set times
5. Circles, squares and diamonds indicate respectively manifesto-, expert or mass survey
based measures. The grey vertical lines indicate the range between the highest and lowest
MRSE for the individual folds.
The five measures from hand coded manifestos, the original measure, Rile, KimFord-
ing, Vanilla and MCSS all perform quite equally. MCSS gets a somewhat lower MRSE.
In general, the manifesto measures perform better than mass surveys, but they also have
considerable more observations. The differences should not be exaggerated: EVSWVS’
MRSE is only 0.1 higher than Vanilla’s.
With full data sets, Wordfish achieves the lowest MRSE. On average, it misses the
true change in electoral support 0.7 less than ESS.
Looking at the minimum and maximum MRSE for the individual folds, noted by the
grey vertical lines in figure 5.8, most measures varies only modestly. ESS and EVSWVS
however, have a quite different values for their minimum and maximum MRSE. As should
be expected, fewer observations seems to make the model more sensitive to the content
of the observations.
Things do change when the data are reduced to 150 observations, which is the size
of the ESS data set. This is shown in figure 5.9. As before, the 5-Fold CV-estimate is
noted along the y-axis, and the measures along the x-axis. The coloured marks indicate
the most lucky draw, while the remaining 99 draws for each measure is indicated in black
marks above.
All the measures’ luckiest draw are more precise than the MRSE they achieved with
the full data set. Notice that ESS, which has the same observations for all 100 samples,
is able to lower its MRSE by 0.2 simply by changing the composition of the folds. Such
small differences between the measures should therefore not be exaggerated, as they could
be products of fold compositions.
MCSS now has the lowest estimate for its luckiest draw, one 5-fold CV-estimate lower
than ESS. The range between the best (MCSS) and the worst (Wordfish) measure using
manifestos is only 0.14. All measures except Eurobarometer and ESS have its luckiest
draw within 1.64 and 2, a difference of only 0.36. There is certainly very little predictive
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Figure 5.8: Predictions in the full data sets, Williams 2011. The y-axis notes the MRSE.
Measures are aligned along the x-axis, ordered by the number of valid predictions. Cir-
cles, squares and diamonds indicate respectively manifesto-, expert or mass survey based
measures. The coloured mark is the 5-fold CV estimate, and the size is scaled as the
number of predicted observations as a share of the full data set times 5. The colours are
ment to ease comparison of the results. The number of predicted observations is noted in
parentheses. The grey vertical lines ranges from the minimum to the maximum MRSE of
the individual folds for each measure.
power to be gained by changing left-right measure.
Again, Wordfish is neither worst nor best. Five measures are more precise, five mea-
sures are less precise. The differences could be interpreted in a good or bad way depending
on the reader. Precision is likely to change somewhat with different sizes of data. As
shown, they can vary simply by changing fold composition. However, using these results
as they are, switching from the original measure to Wordfish in this analysis would yield
an average loss of precision by 0.12. This seems a small price to pay for the potential
benefit in automated content analysis.
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Figure 5.9: F-fold CV-estimates across 100 samples, Williams 2011. The 5-Fold CV-
estimate is noted along the Y-axis, and measures are indicated along the X-axis. Circles,
squares and diamonds indicate respectively manifesto-, expert or mass survey based mea-
sures. The coloured marks indicate the most lucky draw. The colours and horizontal black
line are meant to ease the comparison of the most lucky draws. The remaining 99 draws
for each measure is indicated in black circles.
5.4 Discussion of flaws.
There are at least two possible shortcomings in this analysis: Unrepresented measurement
uncertainty and lack of potential for generalization.
Measurement uncertainty is a serious issue. Measurement error in non-linear models
causes bias in the results and makes it harder to detect interesting relationships among
the variables. As pointed out several times during this thesis, when we are trying to mea-
sure an unobservable feature of reality, uncertainty is inevitable. Luckily, measurement
error can be included and tackled in regressions, using for example simulation and ex-
trapolation. Unfortunately, such models often dramatically reduce the estimation-power
(Carroll, Ruppert, Stefanski and Crainiceanu, 2006, p. 1,18-19).
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The results from this thesis may change if measurement error is accounted for. So
far the literature has only mentioned uncertainty as a possible issue, but there are no
thorough evaluations of its impact in analysis. Such an evaluation would be beneficial
for our knowledge of political preferences.
Most measures provide a natural error estimate. Wordfish has a standard error be-
tween the bootstraps, and expert judgements and mass surveys have an error between its
respondents. Some, however, like Rile, Vanilla and KimFording, does not have a “natu-
ral” error estimate. Benoit et al. (2009) therefore suggest a bootstrap-resampling method
to create standard errors for manifesto data.
But the measurement uncertainty is just as unobservable as the positions themselves.
The aforementioned error estimates might not be the correct way to measure uncertainty,
and we have no estimate of uncertainty for the uncertainty estimates. In the future, we
should map to what degree different measures of uncertainty impact our analyses. This
is uncharted territory for future research.
A second shortcoming is generalization. It is not obvious that the findings from this
thesis may be generalized to the broader population of quantitative analyses. The three
models replicated are not a large, randomly drawn representative sample of all analyses
containing the left-right measure. They do not ensure statistical significance for the
conclusion to assess with what certainty we may generalize the results to the population
of analyses as a whole.
While such a strategy could provide a better picture of the representativeness of the
results, it would also risk circularity, where we in the future confirm hypotheses with
measures which in the past have been used to validate the same measures.
This does not rule out the possibility that the “best” measure may vary a lot, and
depend upon the questions at hand. This is a weakness with this thesis. All three
replications supports the hypothesis that the measures differ very little, which speaks in
favour of that this is the true pattern of the measurement methods. But to blatantly
conclude that this will be true for all forthcoming studies would be to exaggerate the
cases’ representativeness.
There are also differences between the replicated models. The most sophisticated of
the three, with the most abundant data, is the one from Franchino and Høyland (2009).
This was also the model where differences were smallest and least sensitive to the different
observations. The least reliable model is the one from Williams (2011), where substantial
conclusions were highly sensitive to the number of observations, as shown in section 4.4.
When the data were made as equivalent as possible, the differences from this model were
also very modest. In the future, however, better models might be found for replications,
which could yield better insight into how the measures behave in different contexts.
Therefore, the argument is not that we should always use automated content analysis.
As always, scholars must consider which measure to use in light of the analysis to be
conducted. A scholar will necessarily not choose the European Social Survey for an
analysis of party systems outside of Europe. All else being equal, we would like a measure
that could be used wherever, but this does not prohibit the use of measures with lower
coverage when we see that they provide the needed data. The argument in this thesis is
that scholars do not need to fear that their variable is not measuring what they wish it
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to measure.
The results should be more likely to hold within legislative studies trying to measure
the parliamentary part of a party, and which uses the left-right measure to capture
distance between parties. The results are less likely to hold for studies which uses the
left-right measure as they are instead of range. None of the analyses replicated are
concerned with the substantial meaning of a specific placement on the left-right scale.
For such analyses, this thesis provides no information of validity.
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Chapter 6
Concluding Remarks
In a false quarrel there is no
true valor
Benedick
Much Ado About Nothing
Act 5 Scene 1
William Shakespeare
The motivation for this thesis sprang out from a personal inability to discern the qual-
ity of left-right measures based on current evaluations. With the growth of unsupervised
computer scripts doing the groundwork of positioning party manifestos, the need for more
thorough and informative validations has become ever more urgent. Notwithstanding the
scepticism, this thesis supports the claim that our measures of parties’ policy positions
on the unidimensional spatial model are all measuring what we want them to measure.
To the contrary, scholars should worry more about low data coverage than invalid
measures to avoid making erroneous inferences. This is the main conclusion from this
thesis, and it speaks in favour for automated computer coding, here represented by Word-
fish. Such new innovations within computer science expands our many possibilities to
tap the latent data in text. The primary obstacle has been lack of resources to harvest
and summarize the many texts out there, and this barrier is about to come down.
This conclusion would not have been discovered using correlations. The most extreme
example from this thesis is Wordfish in the NCM model, which does not correlate with
any of the other measures. Still it gives the same substantial conclusions in replication
and has the same predictive power.
The biggest drawback for an analyst to use automated computer coding is the absence
of a complete data set for modern democracies, which exists for most other measures.
A fairly low amount of resources is needed to build such a complete data set and it can
cover a larger number of party systems both through time and space. It should be a
priority for the community.
Insofar as the scores from automated content analysis continue to be validated, the im-
plications exceeds policy positions. In any field where important political characteristics
can be traced in text and positioned along an axis may this method be viable.
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For example, one may do a textual analysis of constitutions to position political
regimes on a democratic axis. Different measures of democracies are constantly used to
estimate effects from distant pasts, for example on the relationship between democracy
and economic development. Yet democracies are often scored in hindsight and could
be affected by the performance of the respective regime. Automated content analysis
of constitutions, on the other hand, would provide an objective score of a source that is
unaffected by the phenomenons we wish regime types to explain – if it is valid. The scores
could either be a measure in itself, which is interesting for several research questions (see
for example Persson and Tabellini 2005), or part of a more complex operationalization.
Automated content analysis aside, the results indicate that none of the other measures
performs especially different from the rest. In the following, I give a comment to each of
the sources:
Human coded manifestos. Rile, KimFording and Vanilla, are all safe choices. None of
them ever had the strongest predictive power, but neither did they ever have the worst.
In all analyses they have among the best data coverages. These data are easy accessible
and with precise documentation of the parties.
MCSS seems to perform quite equally as its manifesto-brothers. The main disad-
vantage is the embedded restriction to the EU countries. Naturally, a scholar looking
to analyse political parties outside of this area would not choose this measure. Yet the
measure is dependent upon three sources, CMP, EMP and CHESS, without gaining any
increase in prediction power. It requires more buck, but does not provide more bang.
Expert Surveys. Both CMHIBL and CHESS were decent measures, performing neither
best nor worst. CHESS is a fairly recent time-series, and includes only European coun-
tries. However, CHESS’ coverage will continue to increase as the surveys are repeated.
So far, it is the only expert survey trend with the potential to become a comprehensive
data set of political parties and policy positions.
Mass-surveys. Eurobarometer and EVSWVS were among top three in the bargaining
model. There seems to be nothing wrong with the measurement quality in mass-surveys.
The main drawback for all three measures is low coverage. This is especially prominent for
ESS. Seldom will it be more useful than the other two mass-surveys, but for the European
context it will often suffice. Compared to the other two mass surveys, it provides a mass
survey with more stable wording and sampling design.
The three mass surveys could all be improved simply by improving documentation.
Several observations were lost because the party could not be identified. By for example
providing party IDs to some of the more established data sets, this issue could have been
mitigated.
In all, is is good news that we seem to be able to measure parties’ preferences in the
unidimensional spatial model. As the premier model for legislative studies, it confirms the
progress made within one of our most traditional subjects. Preferences are the nucleus
of political science, and it is important that we get it right.
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Appendix A: Martin and Vanberg
All replication material can be made available by mailing haakon.gjerlow@gmail.com
A.1: Comparison of Cox and Weibull
Table A.1: Comparison of Cox and Weibull model for the replication of Martin and
Vanberg 2003
Parameter Cox Weibull
Post-Election 1.74 1.25
(-3.29) (2.86)
Previous Defeat 1.12 1.09
(-0.51) (0.71)
Continuation 0.32 0.59
(4.81) (-5.87)
Identifiability 0.87 0.95
(1.18) (-0.64)
Range of Governement 1.27 1.1
(-1.98) (1.97)
Number of Government Parties 0.25 0.46
(10.91) (-16.01)
Number of Government Parties ∗ln(T) 1.63 1.31
(-13.76) (10.49)
Minority Government 1.6 1.28
(-2.26) (3.39)
Log(Scale) 0.49
(-7.25)
Intercept 16.5
(13.62)
Log-Likelihood -722 -712
N 203 203
Notes: Survival functions. T-values in parentheses
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A.2: Descriptive Statistics
Table A.2: Dummies in Martin and Vanberg 2003
No Yes
Post election 93 132
Previous defeat 34 191
Continuation rule 151 74
Minority government 143 82
Min = 1, Median = 20, 
Mean = 28.36, sd = 31.51, Max = 205
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Figure A.1: Numeric variables in Martin and Vanberg 2003
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Appendix B: Franchino and Høyland
B.1: Descriptive Statistics
Table B.1: Dummies in Franchino and Høyland 2009
No Yes
Parliament Involved 5263 826
EU Council Involved 2646 3443
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Figure B.1: Descriptives for Numeric Variables, Franchino and Høyland 2009
B.2: Replication with 10 alternative measures
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Table B.2: Replication of Franchino and Høyland 2009 with 10 alternative measures
Parameters Rile KimF Vanilla EVSWVS CMHIBL
Intercept -2.206 -2.098 -2.426 -2.406 -2.969
(0.338) (0.345) (0.322) (0.316) (0.332)
Conflict 0.035 0.151 0.345 0.526 0.355
(0.014) (0.078) (0.087) (0.182) (0.081)
Council 0.428 0.381 0.435 0.475 0.404
(0.125) (0.129) (0.125) (0.129) (0.122)
Complexity 0.097 0.077 0.116 0.109 0.134
(0.091) (0.093) (0.09) (0.091) (0.088)
Deadline Years 0.257 0.251 0.239 0.285 0.244
(0.058) (0.06) (0.057) (0.059) (0.056)
Agenda Control -0.493 -0.44 -0.364 -0.586 -0.123
(0.166) (0.17) (0.168) (0.214) (0.195)
Amendment Prerogatives 0.358 0.326 0.331 0.34 0.338
(0.055) (0.057) (0.053) (0.057) (0.056)
Confidence Vote -0.093 -0.117 -0.059 -0.201 -0.059
(0.046) (0.043) (0.04) (0.042) (0.038)
Bicameralism -0.252 -0.26 -0.16 -0.23 -0.093
(0.05) (0.049) (0.044) (0.054) (0.043)
Cabinet Turnover -0.03 -0.026 -0.041 0.019 -0.015
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006)
Environment 0.473 0.51 0.534 0.452 0.447
(0.168) (0.169) (0.168) (0.188) (0.167)
Finance 1.605 1.673 1.637 1.998 1.719
(0.232) (0.234) (0.232) (0.243) (0.228)
Industry 0.589 0.635 0.611 0.65 0.589
(0.123) (0.124) (0.123) (0.137) (0.122)
Interior 1.757 1.867 1.897 2.025 1.838
(0.427) (0.43) (0.427) (0.441) (0.428)
Public administration 1.113 1.219 1.183 1.059 1.326
(0.439) (0.441) (0.437) (0.466) (0.427)
Public Health 0.885 0.859 1.002 1.52 1.303
(0.555) (0.562) (0.553) (0.563) (0.538)
Social affairs 0.658 0.719 0.701 0.805 0.778
(0.258) (0.26) (0.257) (0.274) (0.255)
Transport 0.072 0.123 0.102 0.196 0.109
(0.157) (0.158) (0.157) (0.17) (0.156)
X Council 0.015 0.087 0.092 0.193 0.082
(0.005) (0.028) (0.035) (0.065) (0.03)
X Complexity -0.002 -0.006 -0.026 -0.02 -0.013
(0.003) (0.019) (0.024) (0.044) (0.021)
X Deadline length 0.001 0.008 0.016 0.033 0.017
(0.002) (0.013) (0.016) (0.029) (0.015)
X Agenda control 0.01 0.042 -0.003 -0.168 -0.179
(0.01) (0.055) (0.068) (0.198) (0.078)
X Amendment prerogatives -0.018 -0.079 -0.094 -0.201 -0.056
(0.003) (0.015) (0.018) (0.052) (0.019)
X Confidence Vote -0.007 -0.035 -0.061 -0.087 -0.068
(0.002) (0.011) (0.012) (0.037) (0.012)
X Bicameralism 0.018 0.09 0.092 0.165 0.079
(0.003) (0.013) (0.017) (0.05) (0.015)
Intercept, Variance 0.717 0.729 0.717 0.708 0.704
(0.847) (0.854) (0.847) (0.841) (0.839)
Log Likelihood -1600.991 -1601.456 -1605.787 -1270.786 -1608.537
N, 2nd level N 5582, 722 5582, 722 5582, 722 4657, 715 5510, 722
Notes: Dependent variable is parliamentary involvement. Standard Errors in parentheses
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Table B.3: Replication of Franchino and Høyland 2009 with 10 alternative measures
(continued)
Parameters Eurobar MCSS ESS CHESS WORD
Intercept -2.563 -2.249 -1.933 -3.601 -1.188
(0.351) (0.332) (0.395) (0.447) (0.381)
Conflict 0.528 0.31 -0.071 1.032 -0.126
(0.236) (0.106) (0.227) (0.179) (0.276)
Council 0.389 0.457 0.343 0.254 0.993
(0.127) (0.118) (0.136) (0.127) (0.182)
Complexity 0.093 0.057 0.169 0.126 -0.116
(0.091) (0.086) (0.096) (0.093) (0.123)
Deadline Years 0.261 0.21 0.295 0.243 0.221
(0.059) (0.056) (0.062) (0.061) (0.076)
Agenda Control -0.54 -0.617 -0.3 -0.453 -1.454
(0.19) (0.164) (0.198) (0.212) (0.263)
Amendment Prerogatives 0.401 0.33 0.356 0.537 -0.317
(0.06) (0.058) (0.067) (0.078) (0.097)
Confidence Vote -0.154 -0.068 -0.217 0.065 -0.111
(0.044) (0.04) (0.047) (0.053) (0.045)
Bicameralism -0.196 -0.114 -0.337 -0.046 0.04
(0.053) (0.042) (0.058) (0.052) (0.069)
Cabinet Turnover 0.005 -0.026 -0.03 -0.019 -0.024
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
Environment 0.548 0.493 0.542 0.38 0.635
(0.174) (0.163) (0.19) (0.168) (0.238)
Finance 1.805 1.562 1.954 1.746 1.918
(0.234) (0.227) (0.249) (0.231) (0.323)
Industry 0.711 0.572 0.722 0.512 0.738
(0.129) (0.119) (0.141) (0.121) (0.181)
Interior 2.022 1.726 1.971 1.656 2.645
(0.434) (0.415) (0.447) (0.41) (0.574)
Public administration 1.642 1.076 0.971 1.34 1.297
(0.429) (0.426) (0.479) (0.425) (0.572)
Public Health 1.423 0.814 1.321 1.044 0.94
(0.54) (0.544) (0.566) (0.523) (0.774)
Social affairs 0.86 0.672 0.771 0.431 0.775
(0.26) (0.251) (0.28) (0.259) (0.356)
Transport 0.256 0.073 0.119 0.1 0.104
(0.162) (0.152) (0.181) (0.153) (0.235)
X Council 0.123 0.074 0.247 0.23 0.03
(0.062) (0.035) (0.084) (0.056) (0.114)
X Complexity 0.028 0.015 -0.038 -0.056 0.11
(0.043) (0.024) (0.055) (0.038) (0.073)
X Deadline length 0.027 0.027 0.004 0.033 0.074
(0.027) (0.015) (0.027) (0.028) (0.041)
X Agenda control -0.167 0.03 -0.057 -0.046 0.641
(0.15) (0.096) (0.192) (0.123) (0.451)
X Amendment prerogatives -0.26 -0.152 -0.195 -0.312 0.137
(0.058) (0.025) (0.051) (0.04) (0.072)
X Confidence Vote -0.057 -0.076 -0.003 -0.157 -0.126
(0.044) (0.016) (0.041) (0.027) (0.04)
X Bicameralism 0.114 0.114 0.267 0.131 0.048
(0.058) (0.021) (0.055) (0.031) (0.079)
Intercept, Variance 0.674 0.672 0.76 0.642 1.31
(0.821) (0.82) (0.872) (0.801) (1.144)
Log Likelihood -1400.709 -1630.956 -1266.565 -1452.196 -1069.486
N, 2nd level N 4801, 716 5582, 722 4705, 716 4892, 716 3950, 709
Notes: Dependent variable is parliamentary involvement. Standard Errors in parentheses
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Appendix C: Laron K. Williams
C.1: Descriptive Statistics
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Figure C.1: Descriptives, numeric and categorical, Williams 2011
C.2: Replication with 10 alternative measures
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Appendix D: Question Wordings
Table D.1: Mass Survey Questions
Survey Question
ESS In politics people sometimes talk of ’left” and ’right’.
Using this card, where would you place yourself on this scale,
where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?
Some people don’t vote nowadays for one reason or another.
Did you vote in the last [country] national election in [month/year]?
Which party did you vote for in that election?
WVS In political matters, people talk of ”the left” and ”the right.”
How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?
In 2000: If there were a national election tomorrow,
for which party on this list would you vote?
Just call out the number on this card. If Don’t know: Which party appeals to you most?.
In 1999: If there was a general election tomorrow,
which party would you vote for?
In 1995: If there were a [COUNTRY] election tomorrow,
for which party on this list would you vote?
Just call out the number on this card.
EVS In political matters, people talk of ’the left’ and ’the right’.
How would you place your views on this scale generally speaking?
1981: ¡Ask if consider to be close to a particular party¿ To which party?
1990 and 1999: If there was a general election tomorrow, which party would you vote for?
2008: [If there was a general election tomorrow, can you tell me if you would vote?]
If yes: which party would you vote for?
Eurobarometer In political matters, people talk of ’the left’ and ’the right’.
How would you place your views on this scale?
Which party did you vote for in the last general election?
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